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This thesis attempts to explain the origins of, and the reasons for the
persistence of non-democratic forms of rule in the Arab world. It seeks to
define the minimum social prerequisites for the development of democratic
institutions, and then shows that in large measure these prerequisites are
lacking in Arab societies. Moreover, this deficiency is not the result of Islam
or the "Arab mind," but is primarily a consequence of the socioeconomic
structures found in the Arab world.
The thesis flows from the general to the specific in first providing an
overview of socioeconomic structures, by dividing them into three categories:
hunter/ gatherers, agrarian and modern industrial. It makes the argument that
the socioeconomic structures of modern industrial society generate social
circumstances that are far more favorable to the development of democratic
political institutions than either the agrarian or the hunter/gatherer. Following
this, the thesis looks specifically at the socioeconomic structures of the Arab
world, making the argument that, largely as a result of the character of
cultural and economic interaction with the West, the societies of the Arab
world have maintained their primarily agrarian structure and they are
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This thesis is a theoretical argument based on general observation and
deduction that attempts to explain both the origins of, and the reasons for the
persistence of non-democratic forms of rule in the Arab world. The principal
question that it seeks to answer is: Why has it proven so exceedingly difficult
if not impossible for democracy to develop in the Arab world? The answer to
this riddle does not lie specifically in Islam (as many Western authors have
argued) nor does it lie in some congenital defect of the Arab mind. Rather, the
answer can be found in the socioeconomic structures of the Arab world,
structures that are primarily agrarian in nature which predispose Arab politics
toward more hierarchical and authoritarian forms of rule and away from more
democratic political institutions.
The thesis first attempts to define the minimum social prerequisites for the
development of democratic political institutions at the nation-state level. These
are defined as: consent, the rule of law, and citizenship based on nationality.
In keeping with the "general to specific" nature of the argument, the thesis
then provides a broad overview of socioeconomic structures, dividing them
into three groups: hunter/gatherer, agrarian and modern industrial. Although
these groups are only ideal types, they do provide an intellectual framework
within which the fundamental aspects of various socioeconomic structures may
be grasped more easily. The thesis shows that because of the social
requirements of each of these three ideal types of structures, they tend to
engender, or at least create the prerequisites for, certain political developments.
Specifically, while socioeconomic structures that are primarily agrarian tend to
produce political institutions that are hierarchical and authoritarian,
socioeconomic structures that are primarily hunter/gatherer or modern
industrial tend to foster more egalitarian political orders (although for very
different reasons).
The thesis then looks specifically at the socioeconomic structures of the
Arab world and attempts to demonstrate that despite Arab governmental
pronouncements to the contrary, the admixture of elements from the
hunter/ gatherer and modern industrial "stages" (in other words, the societies
of the Arab world are not, much like any place else, ideal representations of
theoretical frameworks), and the superficial differences in the character of the
various Arab regimes; the socioeconomic structures of the Arab world are
primarily of the agrarian type. As a result, Arab societies tend to be governed
in a authoritarian manner.
The third and final point of the thesis is that the primarily agrarian
socioeconomic structures of the Arab world are both held in place and
distorted by the character of the economic and cultural interaction with the
West. Economically, the "world system," dominated by the productive
capacity of the West, makes entry into the industrial and manufacturing
spheres difficult to accomplish as the West holds an almost insurmountable
VI
comparative advantage in quantity and quality of production (although as the
example of Japan and the "four tigers" suggests, this advantage may not be
absolute and forever). The economies of the Arab world simply have no
choice but to integrate with the economies of the West, but they can compete
and survive economically within the system only through the extraction of raw
materials, or agrarian type economic functions.
At the same time, however, this economic interaction has the effect of
producing new classes of people in Arab society (bank clerks, teachers, refinery
technicians, etc.) that tend to militate against the authoritarian bent of the
agrarian order. Ironically, such interaction also provides for the importation of
the technology that makes it far easier for the authoritarian ruler to intrusively
and violently impose his/their regime on society.
Culturally, the alien "other" is seen in both Arab and European societies as
an obstacle to be overcome. The introduction of Western originated ideas and
methods into Arab societies, therefore, arouses a great deal of suspicion and
distaste. Since modernization and westernization are so closely associated
with one another, it is difficult at best for Arab societies to internalize the





"Political liberalization, if not democracy, seems to be on Arab agendas." 1 This
optimistic statement opened an issue of the Middle East Report devoted
exclusively to the question of democracy in the Arab world. However, it was
quickly qualified by the following: "At the same time, most of these openings
have been controlled, if not calibrated, by the respective regimes [in Algeria,
Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen];" and, "Even where elections have
encompassed wide sectors of the population and included opposition forces, they
have been for parliaments with little power vis-a-vis the president or king." 2
Why has it proven so exceedingly difficult if not impossible for democracy to
develop in the Arab world? Indeed, upon examination of the politics of the
region, one is struck by the persistence of non-democratic forms of rule, and the
near complete lack of democratic institutions in an era in which the pursuit of
democracy seems to be becoming a universal phenomenon. Is this the result of
some congenital defect? Are Arabs incapable of democracy? While this seems to
be the view of some Western authors, the answer to the riddle of democracy (or
lack thereof) in the Arab world is more complex and multi-faceted. This is the
principal riddle to be addressed in the pages that follow, and the answer, as we
shall discover, can be found in the socioeconomic structures of the Arab world,
structures that are primarily agrarian in nature which predispose Arab politics
toward more hierarchical and authoritarian forms of rule and away from more
democratic political forms. Additionally, the principal factors that have
Ijoe Stork et al., "The Democracy Agenda in the Arab World," Middle East Report No. 174,
(January-February 1992), p. 3.
2 Ibid.
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contributed to the maintenance of those socioeconomic structures are the Arab
world's cultural and economic interactions with the West.
It is my intention here to first outline how socioeconomic structures in
general tend to predispose the political structures of their societies; second, to
place Arab socioeconomic structures within that general outline, specifically,
within the agrarian "stage" which is, as we shall see, antithetical to democratic
political structures; and third, to define the primary factors that contribute to the
maintenance of this particular kind of socioeconomic structure, namely: the
Arab world's cultural and economic interaction with the West.
There is perhaps no other region of the world which has evolved culturally in
such contrast and opposition to the West, and vice versa. Even the term
"Middle East," within which the Arab world is described in the West, places the
two cultural worlds in sharp contrast and is repugnant to most Arab sensibilities
because it defines the Arab world in relation to the West. 3 This cultural
antagonism has far reaching consequences for reasoned scholarship and debate,
on both sides of the "great divide," regarding the political questions raised in this
thesis. Even the very question of democracy in the Arab world, when discussed
in the West, takes on an oxymoronic character that is symptomatic of this
historical interaction.
The reason for this is quite clear. There are two contradictory and stereotypical
images of Arab politics as seen through the lens of Western cultural bias:
"oriental despotism" and weak, inept states attempting, unsuccessfully, to
govern strong societies. The reason for these contradictory images is not based
on fact, but a fundamental misunderstanding of Middle Eastern societies. For
example, Marx's notions of the "hydraulic" central state and the
communal/isolated villages as forming the basis of the "asiatic mode of
3Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 134.
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production" are divergent. If the central state takes on the exclusive role of
providing hydraulic public works and, hence, life to perpetually arid regions as
the basis of its power, then the "isolated" and autonomous village is an
impossibility. Furthermore, the major "oriental despotisms" that Marx wrote of
had very little to do with water works (e.g. Ottoman Turkey and Mogul India).
The conciliation between the two contradictory stereotypes is put succinctly by
Ernest Gellner: "The ancient centralized state [of which it is fair to say that the
Middle Eastern sultanates were a prototypical example and the basis for the
"oriental despotism" image], notwithstanding its much-proclaimed absolutist
pretensions, is seldom powerful enough to control effectively the daily life of the
populations under its sway. Characteristically it governs, not a mass of atomized
individuals, but a collection of at least partly autonomous local communities."4
The distinction between the stereotypical image of despotism and totalitarian,
absolutist despotism will be discussed in greater detail below as the subject has
particular significance in the difference between "traditional" political structures
and "neo-traditional" political structures or what Hisham Sharabi has termed
"neopatriarchy." 5
In neither stereotypical case (as is true with most stereotypes), however, is
there any room for a realistic discussion of the problems and possibilities within
Arab politics. In fact, Western authors, beginning with the ancient Greeks6 and
continuing more or less unabated through Bernard Lewis 7 and others, have
4Ernest Gellner, Plough. Sword and Book; The Structure of Human History . (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988), p. 71.
5Hisham Sharabi, Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society . (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1988).
6
"For Barbarians, being more servile in character than Hellenes, and Asiatics than Europeans, do
not rebel against despotic government. Such royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the
people are, by nature, slaves." Aristotle, Politics. Bk III, Chap. 14.
7See Bernard Lewis, "Roots of Muslim Rage," Atlantic Monthly
.
226:3 (September 1990). See also
the writings of such influential Western minds as Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws and The
Persian Letters, and Hegel, The Philosophy of History , among others.
tended to focus almost exclusively on the cultural differences between East and
West, differences which have typically been presented in an extremely biased and
chauvinistic manner. Arab culture and the political culture which springs from
it cannot, they say, foster democratic institutions. But political culture changes
much more rapidly than it is given credit for doing.
As it is sometimes defined, the concept of political culture is "understood as
the predispositions, including beliefs, values, and affective attachments that
influence political behavior," and it "assumes that the attitudes held by members
of [a] society interact with memories of the past and expectations about the
future, with the evolving interests of groups and individuals, and with the
cultures of other nations." 8 It is this interaction with the past and with the
cultures of other nations as well as the evolving expectations about the future
that makes political culture so unstable and elusive at any given moment. What
is clear, however, is that Arab political culture, as a rapidly changing and
evolving phenomenon, cannot be held solely responsible for Arab political
structures and institutions, particularly as those structures and institutions have
remained relatively stagnant.
The prevailing stereotype, thanks to such visible personalities as Saddam
Hussein and Hafez al-Asad, is that of "oriental despotism." This image, like the
other, contradictory image, has deep roots in the Western cultural tradition
beginning with the ancient Greek city-states. The "free" Greeks of the ancient
world feared and hated the Eastern peoples of the then Persian empire "as
instruments of despotic power bent on robbing them of liberty and reducing
them to subject status. A war against Persia therefore partook of the character of
8Thomas F. Remington and Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Politics in the USSR," in Gabriel Almond and
G. Bingham Powell (eds.), Comparative Politics Today, Fifth Edition, (New York: Harper Collins,
1992), p. 359.
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a 'crusade'..."9 This "crusade" mentality and the idea of the alien other in both
Western and Middle Eastern cultures has had a profound and determining
influence on the self-image of both cultures through the centuries, an influence
which will be discussed in detail below.
Economically, the development of mercantile capitalism and subsequent
industrialization in the western European "core" has had an enormous impact
on the "periphery" regions of which the Arab world is a part. 10 Specifically, the
conditions which brought about the internal division of labor in the "core" area
(e.g. the autonomous and indigenous explosion in cognitive growth spurred on
by the unshackling of the economic sphere from the military/ political and the
religious) have produced, in their maturity, an international division of labor, or
what Wallerstein referred to as the "modern world system."
This is a system in which the "periphery" areas can only be economically
competitive with the "core" in the extraction of raw materials, hence creating a
global division of labor. Whether the extractive process involves agriculture
(from which the model of the Agrarian socioeconomic structure is derived) or
mining of raw materials, it makes little difference. As will be discussed below,
this situation has significant cultural and political consequences for the
"periphery" countries as the extractive process is not conducive to producing an
internal division of labor which is the bedrock of modern democracy at the
nation-state level. This is not to say, however, that what I intend to put forth is
strictly a variation on dependency theory, regarding the internal factors operating
within Arab societies as mere reflections of external economic and political
9John Keegan, The Mask of Command. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 23.
l°See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System. (San Francisco: Academic Press, 1980).
See also Andre G. Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment, (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1978).
relations. 11 To the contrary, as stated above, what will be outlined in the pages
that follow are the principal factors which predispose rather than determine
Arab political structures, and the internal elements of Arab societies are among
them.
Before proceeding with the more general discussion of democracy in the Arab
world, it will be first necessary to define the primary concept used in that
discussion: democracy.
A. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?
"One cannot undertake the history of any historic entity...without establishing
its definition, without fixing its limits." 12 This is especially true with regard to
democracy, and attempting to define the term "democracy" is a bit like shooting
at a rapidly moving target as the concept has been defined and redefined over the
centuries depending on the various historical circumstances in which it appears.
'"Democracy,"' to the ancient Greeks, "meant government by all the citizens,
among whom slaves and women were not included." 13 Here lies the first key
difference between the democracy of the ancients and that of the moderns: who
is a citizen? Nowhere in the political philosophy of the Greeks do we find such
notions as the all-inclusive citizenship of the "nation" and the consequent
espousal of equality and freedom for all. These are strictly modern ideals. To the
Greeks of antiquity, real freedom and equality could be found only in the
"public" realm, as distinguished from the "private" realm of the individual
household where the necessities of life were paramount. Quite the reverse is
11 For an argument along these line^, see Samuel J. Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela,
"Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American
Underdevelopment" in Heraldo Munoz, ed., From Dependence to Development . (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1981).
12Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought. Vol. I . (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 1.
13Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 9.
true now. Freedoms in the modern age are generally described in terms of the
"private" realm as shelters against the onslaught of the "public" or political
arena. The claim to citizenship and the rights and freedoms of the "public"
realm of the citizens of antiquity was exclusively for the heads of households or
such others who had the means or, to be more precise, the property to be free
from the necessities of the "private" world of home and hearth. This, in most
cases, excluded craftsmen and traders as well as women and slaves from "public,"
political life, from a vita activa . 14
For the citizen, however, though they were a decidedly exclusive group,
Athenian democracy "was in some respects more democratic than any modern
system. Judges and most executive officers were chosen by lot, and served for
short periods; they were thus average citizens, like our jurymen, with the
prejudices and lack of professionalism characteristic of average citizens." 15
Political decisions and debate were made in common as were judicial decisions. 16
For those who were fortunate enough to be citizens, the concept of democracy
represented true freedom, equality, and brotherhood.
The second key difference between the ancient and modern notions of
democracy lies in the transferral of the term "democracy" onto a republican form
of government. At the macro-societal, nation-state level, true democracy is a
practical impossibility for obvious reasons. "The complex division of labor, the
complementarity and interdependence and the constant mobility [economic and
social]: all of these factors prevent citizens from doubling up as producers and
participants in violence [i.e. the military/political structure]." 17 The solution to
14See, for example, Plato's statements on citizenship in Laws. Bk VIII, 842d and 846d as well as
Aristotle's discussion of citizenship in Politics . Bk III, Chap. 5, among others. See also Hannah
Arendt's discussion of the concept of labor in the yolis and its implications for citizenship in The
Human Condition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 79-84.
15RusselI, p. 74.
16See Plato's description of the trial of Socrates in Apology.
17Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 88.
the problem is a representative form of government, or a republic. This also
serves the purpose (echoing James Madison and, in this case, David Hume as
well) of refining democracy in such a way as to dampen the effects of simple
majority rule and the injustices which would (and have done so in ancient
Athens if we are to judge by what we know of the turbulent history of that city-
state) inevitably follow. To quote from Madison: "The effect of the first
difference [i.e. between direct democracy and a representative republic] is, on the
one hand to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom [as a group, not necessarily
as individuals18 ] may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations." 19
In view of the changing meaning of the term "democracy," what can be said
regarding an operational definition of the term? As I see it, there are three
primary elements involved in the modern notion of democracy. The first
element, the cornerstone of any democratic system, is the ideal of the consent of
the governed, either directly, as in the case of true democracy, or indirectly
through electoral representation, as is the case today. It makes little or no
difference for my purposes here whether the marxist critique of "bourgeois
democracy," that the claim of consent of the many is "a sham that makes the de
facto rule of the few more effective and secure behind a screen of formally
democratic institutions,"20 is valid or not. The perception of consent, real or
18As an aside, see Aristotle, Politics . Bk III, which Madison and others of his day were surely
familiar with, for a discussion of the notion that because true wisdom and virtue are relatively rare
in individuals, the more citizens involved in making decisions for the city, the more wise and
virtuous those decisions were likely to be.
19James Madison, The Federalist: No. 10 .
20Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al., Capitalist Development and Democracy. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992), p. 10.
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otherwise, whether by direct participation or elected representation, serves as the
validating principle of democracy.
The second element involved is that of law or, more specifically, the rule of
abstract law versus the rule of personality. The term "abstract law," hereafter
referred to as simply "law," is used here to differentiate between laws which are
associated with a personality such as the edicts of a monarch or prophetic verse,
and the abstract rules, discussed and deliberated among men, that apply equally
to all members of a society. The rule of law, part of what Max Weber termed the
"rationalization" of society, is key to the success of democratic institutions and is
intricately woven into the fabric of that peculiar form of civilization known as
"Western."
Of the forms of domination, or rule, which Weber studied in considerable
detail, "only legal domination is shown to be the result of gradual development.
The rule of law is neither bound up with the hero in history [as is the case within
Weber's concept of charismatic domination] nor with sacred tradition [as in
traditional domination]; it cannot 'erupt' like the first nor endure like the
second. It is the specific product of human deliberation..."21 developed in the
unique history of Western civilization.
It is unique because of the peculiar confluence of the Greco-Roman and Judeo-
Christian currents within it which provided the spark to ignite the Renaissance—
-a period that Perry Anderson has rightly called, "the crux of European history as
a whole. ..The revival of Roman law [which provided a coherent and systematic
framework for the purchase, sale, lease, hire, loan, and testation of goods and
property, unlike, for example, the Islamic Shari'a which is uncertain in matters
of real estate] was accompanied or succeeded by the reappropriation of virtually
2lReinhard Bendix, Max Weber; An Intellectual Portrait. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1977), p. 397.
the whole cultural inheritance of the classical world [or, to put it in marxist
terms, the cultural superstructure of antiquity was placed nearly intact onto the
infrastructure of the feudal mode of production]—an event with literally earth-
shattering consequences of which the progress and evolution of the rule of law
was a major contributor."22
The importance of the rule of law as a necessary element of modern
democracy is twofold. First, it serves as a protection for society against the
capriciousness of the state and, therefore, provides an environment in which
"civil society" can flourish. Secondly, it levels the playing field of economic
competition where all economic actors operate under the same set of rules,
engendering a situation where the market mechanism can function and where,
as a consequence, a "rational," complex division of labor can proceed.
The third necessary element of modern democracy is the issue of citizenship.
Who is a citizen and what does citizenship entail? As has been discussed above,
the idea of citizenship has changed dramatically over the centuries. In the polis,
citizenship was based on gender, property and, by extension, kinship groups.
Now, it is based on one qualification, and one qualification only: nationality.
The simple answer to the question of who belongs in a given national group
is those who were born into that group or have been admitted to it by
"naturalization." But this still leaves us with the more complex issues of what
constitutes a national group (or nation), and what is implied by the process of
"naturalization?" Attempts to codify what exactly meant by the term "nation"
have often led to a shared culture, a sense that a particular group has a shared
history, language, race and /or religion. But this argument is at once too broad
and too narrow. It is too broad because it includes such entities as clubs, political
parties, and even street gangs as well as nations. It is too narrow because it fails
22Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State . (New York: Verso, 1979), pp. 422, 426.
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to account for the cohesive force that binds these collections of individuals
together. That force has been described as "will," and the concept of "will" is the
other principal claimant to the idea of what makes a nation. But this is also too
broad as there are numerous other groups that "will" themselves into being
through self-identification, coercion or self-interest.
Gellner's thought-provoking work on nations and nationalism sheds a great
deal of light on these questions. "When general social conditions make for
standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire
populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-
defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the
only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify. The
cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. ..Under
these conditions...nations can be defined in terms both of will and of culture, and
indeed in terms of the convergence of them both with political units."23
In other words, it is not merely the juxtaposition of culture and will, but a
consciousness of culture and the will to perpetuate it that constitutes a nation.
When culture becomes an identifier, a passport, if you will, to participate in the
social and political life of the group, it becomes "visible," no longer reserved for
the ruling elite or shrouded in the mystery of the high priesthood. It becomes
the idiom through which all members of the society relate to one another and
the lens though which those outside the group are viewed. As an aside, "the
price [the formerly] high cultures pay for becoming the idiom of entire territorial
nations, instead of appertaining to a clerkly stratum only, is that they become
secularized. They shed absolutist and cognitive pretensions, and are no longer
linked to doctrine."24
23Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 55.
24 Ibid., p. 78.
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The result is that the nature of citizenship has changed from one of more
substantial qualifications such as property, gender, and lineage to one of more
cerebral qualifications: basic education, or the internalization of social norms,
and the consequent ability to function in the highly complex cultural idiom of a
given society. Hence, the importance of standardized and homogeneous
education in the age of nationalism as well as the peculiar (or what would have
been called peculiar in every age before our own) process known as
"naturalization," through which, theoretically speaking, any individual from
any place on earth can become a citizen of a given political unit simply by
internalizing, by means of education, the culture of that unit over a more or less
random time period to insure that the internalization is complete.
When these three elements (consent, rule of law, and citizenship within the
confines of nationality) are brought together, they form the sufficient
prerequisites for modern democracy. They provide the soil in which democracy
may take root. Such attributes of democratic government as freedom of
expression and association, regular free and fair elections, all-inclusive suffrage,
and the like all must eventually follow from these three basic elements if
democracy is going to succeed in the long-term, but it is not pre-ordained that
they will necessarily do so. 25 "The most far-reaching ideals of democratic
thought—of a government thoroughly and equally responsive to the preferences
of all its citizens or of a polity in which human beings fulfill themselves through
equal and active participation in collective self-rule"26—are precisely that, ideals.
Ideals which, like Plato's allegory of the bright sunlight of ideas,27 have no place
25Take for example the situation in Paraguay where General Stroessuer was elected in 1954 and
ruled until deposed by a coup in 1990.
26Rueschemeyer et al., p. 10.
27Plato, The Republic. Bk VII, 514-520.
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in the "cave" of human relations or human reality, but serve as the ultimate
measuring sticks by which we gage the success or failure of our strivings.
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II. SOCIOECONOMIC STRUCTURES; A GENERAL OVERVIEW
Before getting to the specifics of Arab socioeconomic structures, it will first be
necessary to explore socioeconomic structures in general. Socioeconomic
development has sometimes been divided into three broad stages or categories:
hunter /gatherer, agrarian, and modern industrial. 28 While this division is
indeed useful as a theoretical tool for organizing and clarifying the complexity
that is the history of mankind, it is precisely this usefulness that often lends itself
to the reification of these concepts and a consequent distortion of reality. "The
mental construct of a cultural [or socioeconomic] stage merely means,
analytically speaking, that the individual phenomena of which it is composed
are 'adequate' to one another, that they have. ..a certain measure of inner
'affinity,' but not that they are related in any determinate way..."29
What is proposed in the following, moreover, is not intended as a purely
materialist "stage" theory or a regurgitation of Marx. Although these "stages" are
primarily differentiated on the basis of their economic regimes, it should be
noted beforehand that the economic infrastructure cannot be fully separated
from the social superstructure. The two are interactive with one another;
elements of the infrastructure (i.e. technological advance in the means of
28There has certainly been no shortage of "stage" theories of development related principally to
economics and the social consequences of various economic systems. Consider, for example, W.W.
Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth : Marx's Feudalism, Capitalism, and Socialism; and
Adam Smith's Hunting, Pastoral, Agricultural, Commercial, and Manufacturing stages. The three
"stages" that I have proposed here, based largely on the thought-provoking work of Ernest Gellner
in Plough. Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History, cited above, are meant neither to add
to nor detract from whatever merits these various other "stage" theories may have, but merely to
provide a convenient intellectual fr.imework within which Arab socioeconomic structures may be
placed in relation to other socioeconomic structures, both past and present.
29Max Weber, "Gesammelte Aufsatze Zur Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte," quoted in
Introduction to Economy and Society , Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1978), p. XLIV
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production) are the result of the superstructure (i.e. scientific ideas, ideology, and
philosophy), and vice-versa. As a further disclaimer, these stages are not
mutually exclusive nor are they necessarily a linear progression. 30 "The
continuum of cultural development in the Mediterranean-European realm has
up to now shown neither completed cycles' nor an unambiguous unilinear
development."31 One further, seemingly obvious, and perhaps most important
point regarding "stage" theories in general and the one I will propose here in
particular: there is no uniformity of "stages" across the spectrum of human
existence at any one point in time. While one society may be primarily defined
by one "stage," other societies, very often in close physical proximity, may be
principally defined by the aspects of other "stages." This allows for the reality of
the so-called demonstration effect in bringing about changes in the
socioeconomic structure of a society through external influences.
This being the case, however, there is a great deal of merit in the division of
socioeconomic structures in this manner. Related primarily to modes of
production, each of the stages is readily discernable from the others, and each
marks a relatively distinctive age and equally distinctive structural adaptations to
that age.
30This is the error in conception or. perhaps more importantly, interpretation of most "stage"
theories of development. The various "stages," as ideal types, are rarely, if ever, seen in reality.
More often, what is seen is the overlap of some aspects of two or more different "stages." Further,
"stage theory is most closely associated with a uni-directional rather than cyclic view of
history...Even in the process of devolution and decline, the return to a level experienced previously
is not viewed as a recurrence of the earlier age." Simon Kuznets, "Notes on Stage of Economic
Growth as a System Determinant," quoted in Gerald M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic
Development. Fifth Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 69. Incidentally, in
Western cultures, the linear view has held sway over the cyclical view of history in general since
the Aristotlian refutation ( Politics Bk V, Chap. 12) of the Platonic political cycles (The Republic.
Bk VIII) as evidenced by, among others, Darwin's The Origin of the Species. Hegel's thesis +
antithesis = synthesis in The Philosophy of History, and, in general, the pervasiveness of the idea
of "progress" in Western culture.
31 Weber, p. XCIX.
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A. HUNTER/GATHERERS
The hunter/gatherer stage, within which I shall include pastoral groups, is
defined primarily by a means of subsistence (or production) that relies on the
movement of both people and property. Movement is necessitated by the
changing of the seasons and the consequent shifting of suitable pasture, changes
in vegetation, and/or seasonal movement of game; the threat of attack by more
powerful groups; and the opportunity to attack and plunder other groups using
"hit-and run" tactics which not only give the attackers the advantage of surprise,
but also markedly decrease the probability of a successful counter-attack.
The fundamental consequences of this mode of production for the social
structures of the hunter/gatherer groups are fourfold. First, because of the
necessity for unencumbered movement, there can be only a limited
accumulation of wealth; if it cannot be easily carried or herded off, property is a
hindrance rather than a benefit. Second, as a result of the necessity for
movement, the lack of accumulation of wealth, and the general harshness of
existence at the mercy of nature and the seasons, these groups tend to be
relatively few in number in comparison to agrarian or modern industrial
societies.
Third, primarily as a result of the hunter /gatherers' dependence on and
submission to the forces of nature as well as the overwhelming prevalence of the
spoken over the written word (literacy is seldom, if ever, found among
hunter/gatherers), these groups tend to have conceptual systems which are
referentially fragmented yet socially united. By this, I mean that the objective or
factual world is not seen as a whole. Instead, the factual world is divided into
"multi-purpose sub-systems" in which facts and data are interwoven with
strands of social meaning and ritual. While "the social elements in each sub-
system form a reasonably coherent whole with the social elements in the other
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sub-systems. ..it is the empirical constituents of the diverse sub-systems (when
they are present at all) which fail to cross-relate to each other. Unpurified,
meshed-in with the social, they cannot cross-relate to other pure 'factual'
elements, and there is no common idiom in terms of which they could do so.
Instead, they generally butress up the same pervasive social vision."32
What these multi-purpose sub-systems engender, by not allowing the
intrusion of untainted facts (i.e. facts that are not bound by countless threads of
social meaning), is "a coherent vision of the social and natural world. They
produce a cosmos in which the natural and the social are not sharply or
systematically distinguished "33 It is also no coincidence that these groups, as a
result of the referentially fragmented way in which the natural world is viewed
and the binding of logically inconsistent facts within webs of social meaning,
tend to be exclusively polytheistic. Each deity has its own referential fragment
over which it has domain within the coherent social pantheon of the deities of
the cosmos.
Fourth, hunter/gatherers tend to be organized along patrimonial and
patriarchical lines held together by a strong honor and shame moral system.
"Honor and shame are the constant preoccupation of individuals in small-scale,
exclusive societies where face to face, as opposed to anonymous, relations are of
paramount importance..." 34 The moral systems of honor and shame most likely
developed as a means of social control to ameliorate the intense conflict that the
competition for scarce resources (e.g. suitable pasture, access to water supplies,
32Gellner, Plough. Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History, p. 60. See also David Hume,
Treatise of Human Nature . Bk I, for perhaps the definitive, empiricist analysis of fact/fact and
fact/value separation.
33Ibid.
34John Peristiany, Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society. (Chicago: Midway
Reprints, 1974), p. 11.
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limited wealth, and a limited number of suitable marriage partners) created
within these groups.
These general characteristics of hunter /gatherer groups tend to produce
micro-societies35 with limited resources that are polytheistic and, despite being
patriarchical, are surprisingly egalitarian among the various leaders or patriarchs
within the group.36 Decisions regarding such issues as movement, war and
peace, and the division of spoils are made in conference with due respect given
to the opinions of the "chief" or the head of the society. The reason for this is
quite clear: Because of the lack of wealth accumulation, the ability of any one
segment of the group to pack up and move on with few material consequences,
and the relative equality of martial abilities,37 no one member of the society is
capable of completely dominating the others.
35Although the prevalent tendency for Hunter/Gatherers is toward the micro-society, this does not
necessarily mean that they are few in number or that they are martially impotent. The nomadic
tribes of the Asian steppes (most notably, the Mongols and the Huns) as well as the tribes which
emerged from the Arabian Peninsula to subjugate a majority of the then known world in the seventh
and eighth centuries C.E. were Hunter/Gatherers by the above classification scheme. These
examples, however, are the exception rather than the rule and, moreover, they still exhibit the
same micro-societal characteristics of being highly personalized entities of tightly knit, more or
less independent patriarchical groups that happen to be interwoven into a much larger whole.
36Despite the overall tendency towards egalitarianism, there have been documented cases of
pastoral groups oscillating between fairly egalitarian tribal political structure and tyrannical
forms of rule based on the overwhelming strength of one individual or, more likely, a group or clan.
See, for instance, the work of Robert Montagne on the Berber tribes of the Atlas in The Berbers:
Their Social and Political Organization. (London: Cass Publishing, 1973).
3
'Because this mode of production involves all of the male members of the society as warriors,
either in war-making itself or in hunting game, and because the non-martial activities of these
groups (e.g. herding livestock or moving the group from place to place) are not particularly labor-
intensive, all the male members of the group may, in effect, take on the roles of both producers and
protectors without having to sacrifice one for the other. "Pastoralism is not labor-intensive, but it




Agrarian societies look much different from those of the hunter /gatherers.
Unlike the mobile hunter/gatherer groups, agrarian societies are based upon a
settled community which is tied to the land for its survival. The land is worked
in a highly labor-intensive fashion to produce not only subsistence but, if nature
cooperates, a surplus as well, and the accumulation of wealth is thereby made
possible on a scale unknown to the hunter /gatherers. The agricultural mode of
production leads to several tendencies in the social structures of these groups
which vary significantly from the tendencies of hunter /gatherer socioeconomic
formations.
First, the presence of a storable, settled surplus makes possible a fuller
development of arts and crafts as well as trade with other settled communities.
Second, as a result of the highly labor-intensive nature of this mode of
production, producers must devote all of their time and effort to the land. They
must sacrifice their role as protectors38 in order to be successful producers.
Furthermore, the labor-intensiveness of the agrarian mode of production makes
agrarian societies Malthusian in nature; the more offspring, the more
production. Third, the existence of a stored surplus, not only as a source of
wealth but as a "insurance policy" for the survival of the community in years of
unusual and unfavorable climatic conditions,39 necessitates the protection and
guarding of that surplus against theft or destruction from within or, more likely,
outside the community; it is a matter of survival.
Fourth, the presence of immobile wealth within an environment of
marauding hunter/gatherer groups and neighboring, predatory agrarian
38See previous note.
39The necessity of this "insurance policy" is poignantly illustrated by the Biblical tale of Joseph's
experience in Egypt. See Genesis, 4 1
.
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communities creates a situation in which a siege mentality is likely to develop.
As a result, we see the construction of citadels, fortresses and walled
communities or cities, and the "preemptive strike" against a neighboring
community becomes a rational mode of behavior. "Generically, this much can
be said of agrarian society: its dependence on a storable and seizable surplus and
on land, the principle of escalation of conflict and of the rationality of
preemptive action, jointly ensure that they tend to be governed in a
authoritarian way by a group or stratum which monopolizes the means of
coercion."40 This brings us to the fifth, and perhaps most important, tendency of
agrarian societies: the formation of a simple division of labor.
As stated above, producers must be exclusively that. Due to the labor-
intensive nature of the agrarian mode of production, they may not double as
protectors or warriors as in the hunter /gatherer socioeconomic formations.
Therefore, a warrior class or stratum develops whose sole function is the
protection of the producers or, more often than not, the protection of the
produce itself. It naturally follows that this class of warrior elites becomes a
ruling class which subsists on the products of the producers and tends to gain
wealth by exploiting the producers with the aforementioned monopoly on the
means of coercion. Any surplus, therefore, is usually under the control of and at
the disposal of the warrior elites rather than the producers themselves.
All of this seems to be terribly unjust from the producers' point of view. On
the surface, it would appear that the relatively small warrior stratum of society
would be incapable of maintaining such an unjust situation over an extended
period, even taking into account the siege mentality of this type of society,
40Gellner, Plough. Sword and Book; The Structure of Human History , p. 99. For an extrapolation
from this argument, see Charles Tilly, Coercion. Capital and European States, (Cambridge, MA:
Basil Blackwell, 1990), as he makes a intriguing case that this monopoly on violence and coercion
by a relatively small group within society plaved a large part in the creation and formation of the
European states.
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without being overthrown bv an organized revolt of the producers who
constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, and this is indeed what
often occurs throughout the long, cyclical history of agrarian societies; there
tends to be a violent, periodical recycling of the warrior elites from the
productive masses. Stability is never fully achieved, but the authority of a
particular group of warrior elites and relatively long-term order is maintained in
agrarian societies where the concept of "legitimacy," the perception that the
existing order is just and beneficial, comes into play. "A legitimate government
is one which has succeeded in persuading the governed that it is consistent with
their interests, their duty, or their honor to obey the few." 41 In other words, it is
when the "foxes" (to use Machiavelli's analogy42 ), who rule by guile as opposed
to the "lions" who rule by force or brutality, come to power.
The concept of "legitimacy" would have little meaning to the
hunter/ gatherers. Their societies are ruled by the most able and fit among them,
generally with provisions for consultation as already mentioned. Moreover, if
factionalism becomes too much of a problem, there is always the option for one
or more of the factions to opt out, to simply pack up and leave with relatively
few material consequences. For the agrarians, however, there are significant
centripetal forces (primarily, being tied to the land for their survival) which tend
to hold these societies together (in the physical sense) when, under similar
circumstances of factionalism, the hunter /gatherers would have long since
settled their disputes or gone their separate ways. A sense of legitimacy is,
therefore, an important factor in holding agrarian societies together in the
spiritual sense as much as they are held together in the physical sense. This still
^Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. 2. (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p.
180.
42See The Prince .
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leaves us with the question of how a sense of legitimacy or, to be more specific,
political legitimacy is achieved in agrarian societies.
The other element of the simple division of labor in agrarian societies, aside
from the producers (i.e. the economic realm which includes craftsmen and
traders as well as farmers) and the warrior elites, is the clerisy, or that stratum of
agrarian society which has a monopoly on the sacred and on the rituals which
surround it. Members of this stratum are the agrarian society's "specialists in
cognition;"43 they are the repositories of the society's high culture, traditions,
language, law,44 and, as such, they are the bestowers of legitimacy upon the social
order.
The question of why such a stratum or class develops within agrarian societies
is a complex and perhaps unanswerable one. It would seem, however, that this
development is associated with the combination of two somewhat contradictory
themes: the expansion of the ritualistic sage practices and beliefs of the
hunter/gatherers that are ascriptive to the person and lineage of the sages
themselves to include not just the single tribe or groups of tribes, but a settled
community with increasing numbers, a simple division of labor, and the
resulting increase in vertical social stratification; and the growing use of the
written word with which ritual is "formalized" and goes beyond the person of
the sage to form a canon or dogma that is transcendent of time, place, and the
group or individual. The sages then become "priests" who are touched by, and
are the keepers and guardians of the divine or sacred, but are not necessarily
divine in and of themselves, and whose power rests not in their person per se,
43Gellner, Plough. Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History, p. 121.
44The fundamental importance which is placed by all religions on the strict formalities of ritual
performance leads to a codification of those rituals. This religious formalism—very probably the
first form of legal formalism--come> from the fact that the formula to be pronounced and the
movements to be made contain within themselves the sources of their efficacy, they would lose it if
they did not conform absolutely to the type consecrated by success." Emile Durkheim, The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, (New York: The Free Press, 1915), p. 50.
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but in their knowledge of the Word. "Mankind entered the age of Plato when
the authority of concepts became a theory , when the Transcendent became
manifest as such, and when the paradigmatic incarnation of the concept was no
longer, or not exclusively, found in ritual, but rather in writing. Ritual had once
underwritten the Word, but the Word itself now became a ritual."45
The rise of the Transcendent produces a socially and referentially united
cosmos. The "similarity of the rational regularity of the stars in their heavenly
courses, as regulated by divine order, to the inviolable sacred social order in
terrestrial affairs. ..makes the universal gods the responsible guardians of both
these phenomena."46 The "multi-purpose sub-systems" of the hunter/ gatherers
give way to a unity of the social and natural worlds. A single "world view"
comes into being within which "history" develops as a social, evolutionary
process of Man's compliance with or rejection of the natural order of the all-
encompasing Transcendent. One deity, one world, and one law, although not
necessarily in this order,47 is the universalizing, overarching theme of cognitive
development in agrarian societies.
The idea of a "world history," at the conceptual level, brings every aspect of
the natural and social realms into focus as a whole as opposed to just pieces of a
puzzle acting or being acted upon by separate and disparate forces as in the
hunter/gatherers' conceptuaJ system. "The idea of one sole God. ..was received
[by Muhammad's mostly pastoral contemporaries in Mecca] as simply bizarre.48
It was not that the notables of the Quraysh disagreed with him; it was that at the
beginning they simply did not understand what he was talking about..."49 They
45Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book, The Structure of Human History, p. 87.
46Weber, p. 417. Emphasis is mine.
47In the Roman Empire, for instance, this sequence was more or less reversed: One law, one world,
and one deity.
48
"Maketh he the gods one God? Lo! That is an astounding thing," Qur'an, 38:6.
49Fatima Mernissi, Islam and Democracy
.
(New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1992), p. 97.
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did not understand the homogenization of thought that he wanted to bring
about.
However, while the natural and social, or the referential and non-referential,
are thereby joined at the hip and homogenized, it is the social that gains
conceptual dominance over the natural. Unlike the conceptual systems of the
hunter/gatherers which are fragmented with no clear-cut dominance of the
referential or the non-referential causes and effects of events,50 the conceptual
systems of the agrarian societies include very specific lines of causation between
the natural and the social; the natural is caused by the social, and empirical facts
are thereby slaved to social values. In this situation, strict adherence to the Word
is the key to the survival of the community lest natural disasters or invasion
destroy them; and this can only be accomplished by the literate stratum of society,
or the clerisy, as the sole keepers of the history, the language, the rituals, and the
laws of the Transcendent.
Still, the fear of communal disaster in this world is fairly remote and (to use
Gellner's phrase) "pretty anemic stuff" on which to hold such power over the
laity and to fend off the warrior elites. Something more potent, aimed directly at
the individual is needed to bolster the legitimacy and the political legitimizing
force of the clerisy. This is the essence of the transformation from
"communalistic" to "Salvationist" religious practice and belief which occurs in
agrarian societies, the root of which lies (at least in the monotheistic traditions if
not in the traditions of the Indian subcontinent and beyond to the East) in the
Greek metaphysical construct of the immortal soul. 51
50For instance, if rainfall occurs, then it can be either the result of the capricious whim of a deity or
as a result of a particular ritual performance, or both.
51See Plato, Phaedo, 80a-b, and Meno , Klc, the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls,
and Aristotle, On the Soul. 408b.
24
Within this metaphysical construct, the philosopher alone is the possessor of
real knowledge of the soul and of the Ideal or Transcendent, and the concept of
the philosopher-king in The Republic is a reasoned argument for the rule of the
clerisy. It is an attempt at coercion by reason rather than by violence to ensure
authority and social order. However, "the trouble with coercion through reason
is that only the few are subject to it, so that the problem arises of how to assure
that the many, the people who in their very multitude compose the body politic,
can be submitted to the same truth. In The Republic, the problem is solved
through the myth of rewards and punishments in the hereafter, a myth which
Plato himself obviously neither believed nor wanted the philosophers to believe.
What the allegory of the cave story in the middle of The Republic is for the few
or for the philosopher, the myth of hell at the end is for the many who are not
capable of philosophical truth." 52
The concept of the hereafter and of a vengeful god are the most powerful
symbols the clerisy has at its disposal to maintain its authority and thereby
stabilize what would otherwise be, as pointed out above, an extremely unstable
socioeconomic structure. Plato's arguments, although they constitute much of
the basis for the development of the god concept53 and the theory of the
hereafter, never had the explosive impact of later theological arguments. They
lack both the cohesion (claiming one thing in this work, and another in that) and
the passion displayed by religious prophets. In the words of Emerson: "The
defect of Plato in power is only that which results inevitably from his quality. He
is intellectual in his aim; and therefore, in his expression, literary. ..It is almost
52Hannah Arendt, Between Fast and Future. (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 108.
"The common origin for much of Christian and Jewish philosophy and theology is Platonic. See,
in particular, St. Augustine, City of God. BK 1, Chap. 35; II, 14; and VIII, 5; and those, such as St.
Anselm, who followed his work. See also the impact of Greek philosophy (not only Platonic, but
Stoic and Pythagorean as well) on the work of Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria, at the turn
of the era.
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the sole deduction from the merit of Plato that his writings have not—what is no
doubt incident to this regency of intellect in his work—the vital authority which
the screams of prophets and the sermons of unlettered Arabs and Jews possess."54
The evolution and systemization of the god concept would take several more
centuries and much rational thought delving deeply into the causes and effects
operative in the cosmos, as well as "the vital authority" of prophets. For
instance, while Aristotle rejected Plato's doctrine of the Ideas (as he rejected so
many of Plato's theoretical doctrines) in Metaphysics , there is a critical passage in
that work that deserves attention: "Even when the Forms exist, still the
[material and sensible] things that share in them do not come into being unless
there is something to originate the movement."55 In other words, although this
is part of Aristotle's refutation of the Ideas as first causes, it is, ironically, a key to
understanding the rational progression from the inanimate Ideas to a "living"
first cause, the ultimate Ideal: God. "The God of the theologians, from Aristotle
to Calvin, is one whose appeal is intellectual: His existence solves certain puzzles
which otherwise would create argumentative difficulties in the understanding of
the universe. This Deity. ..appears at the end of a piece of reasoning, like the
proof of a proposition in geometry. ,."56
The apparent rationality (if this "cause and effect" system of thought, despite
its promising beginnings and contrary to expectations, does not produce lasting
cognitive advance, and even tends to stifle such advances over time. First, it is
54Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Plato; or, the Philosopher," in The Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo
Emerson. (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 490-491. The difference between the philosophical
teaching of antiquity and prophetism can be summed under the heading of passion.
"Prophets. ..have elements in common with teachers of ethical philosophy, like Pythagoras [and
Plato], who gather disciples and found schools; but such teachers lack the emotional sermon
through which the prophet proclaims religious truths." Bendix, p. 90. The virtue that the
philosophers of antiquity held to be the good in Man is precisely a controlling and a harnessing of
the passions by reason, whereas prophetism speaks directly to the passions, bypassing reason
altogether.
55Aristotle, Metaphysics. BK I, Chap. 9.
56Russell, p. 585.
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"upside-down" with regard to causes and effects. By the rational, calculating, and
ever doubtful scientific mode of thought which has been the engine behind the
explosion of cognitive growth in modern industrial societies, the natural causes
the social, or certain empirical facts lead to social consequences, not vice-versa.
Furthermore, the enslavement of facts to values smothers scientific, rational,
and purely "objective" thought, except in the relatively rare cases of "pure"
geometry, mathematics, and even astronomy as long as their proofs and results
supported the position of the clerisy and posed no danger to the socioeconomic
order. "Scientific" thought can survive and even flourish within the agrarian
order57 when it pertains to mathematics or astronomy or any other science
which is devoted to the treatment of "simple" objects, but the scientific method
of investigation and the cognitive advances it promotes can only come to
dominate when it is applied to Man himself in his economic and social
organization.
Agrarian societies violently oppose any advance in cognition , of which the
fact/fact and fact/value separation of the scientific method is a key, which
threatens that socioeconomic order. "A society grounded in substantive [as
opposed to formal or bureaucratic58 ] notions of rationality may thus be relatively
secure in its values, which are regarded as matters of fact, but inevitably
demonstrates a resistance to the possibility of its reinvention in history, for its
ideals are regarded as untransformable reflections of nature itself."59
Take, for example, the late European Middle Ages debate on whether the
Earth was at the center of the known universe or occupied some other, less
57See, for example, the synopsis of the careers of al-Razi (865-925 C.E.), al-Biruni (973-1050 C.E.),
and al-Khwarizmi (780-850 C.E.) in medicine, astronomy, and mathematics in Philip K. Hitti,
History of the Arabs. Tenth Edition, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), pp. 365-367, 376-377, 379-
380, respectively.
58See Weber, Chaps. VIII and XI.
59Anthony J. Cascardi, The Subject of Modernity, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
p. 41.
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glamorous and less appealing place within it. The notion, or the "fact," that the
Earth was at the center of the cosmos was very much tied to the belief system
which bestowed order and legitimacy on society. It was intolerable that man,
God's greatest creation whom He created in the image of Himself, could be
relegated to some inconsequential corner of a vast, cold universe. This fact calls
into question the validity of the whole belief system. Therefore, if that belief
system was to maintain its validity, and hence preserve the social order, the
"fact" of the Earth's central place within the cosmos must be maintained.
Dissent is therefore crushed and cognitive growth is stunted. In this regard,
Copernicus and Socrates60 suffered much the same fate for much the same
reason: they challenged the social order, not by denouncing the warrior elites (or
the political rulers), but by endangering the validity of the belief system of the
clerisy which held the social order together and provided its legitimacy.
Second, "every aspect of religious phenomena that points beyond evils and
advantages in this world is the work of a special evolutionary process, one
characterized by distinctively dual aspects. On the one hand, there is an ever-
broadening rational systemization of the god concept [or, for that matter, the
teachings of Buddha or the Hindu karma concept] and of the thinking
concerning the possible relationships of Man to the divine. On the other hand,
there ensues a characteristic recession of the original, practical and calculating
rationalism. As such primitive rationalism recedes, the significance of
distinctively religious behavior is sought less and less in the purely external
advantages of everyday economic [or military/political] success. Thus, the goal of
religious behavior is successively 'irrationalized' until finally other-worldly,
non-economic goals come to represent what is distinctive in religious
60See Plato, Apology.
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behavior." 61 "At some point in its development, every genuinely devout
religious faith brings about, directly or indirectly, that 'sacrifice of the intellect' in
the interests of a trans-intellectual, distinctive religious quality of absolute
surrender62 and utter trust. ..The salvation religions teaching belief in a
transcendental god stress. ..the inadequacy of the individual's intellectual powers
when he confronts the exalted state of the divinity."63
The paradox is that the seemingly rational, systematic formalization of the
Word represents the suppression of cognitive potential and the progressive
irrationalization of behavior when this type of social organization meets with
success. "What in the past has worked for the welfare of the individual and the
community will work in the present. Experience has proven the merit of this
particular way of life; wisdom dictates that it be followed. Adherence to the
teaching [of the Word] assures the individual of acceptance in the group. It also
supports established practices and strengthens the status quo, consequences that
work to the benefit of those in power."64
All of this is not to say that religion, any religion, in and of itself, is the root
cause of social, political, and economic stagnation; or, to take the reverse
argument, that it is primarily responsible for social, political, and economic
success and achievement as has been argued by Weber65 and those that followed
his work. "The difficulty with attempts to connect a particular religious
confession with a particular form of moral [or political and economic] behavior
lies in the fact that life is never as clear as doctrine. Religion as it is creedally
61Weber, p. 424.
62Interestingly, this is a close translation of the Arabic "Islam," or absolute submission."
63Weber, p. 567.
64Dianne Bergant, "The Perspective of Wisdom," in M. Jack Suggs et al., eds., The Oxford Study
Bible. (New York: Oxford University Tress, 1992), p. 175.
65See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
,
(New York: Charles Scribner,
1958).
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defined and religion as it is actually lived exist at different ends of a very long
spectrum..."66
It is, therefore, the role or function that religion and those who are most
closely associated with it perform within the structure of a given society, not the
religion itself per se, which largely determines its interpretation and influence,
and whether or not that society will become stagnated. As James Madison
observed, even "when the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in
their own language, His meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated."67 In other
words, while religion defines the basic metaphysical essence of a culture, it is
itself defined, interpreted, and reinterpreted based on the circumstances of its use
and its place within the socioeconomic structure. If the metaphysical "building
blocks" of culture, as defined by religion, were the sole basis for institutional
structure,68 then the Christian societies of Europe and North America would be
just as socially, economically, and politically stagnant as the Islamic societies of
the Arab world, perhaps even more so. In fact, in the writings of the "founding
fathers" of the American republic there are numerous references to and
descriptions of God and the nature of the universe which are strikingly similar
to those found in the Qur'an. 69 Indeed, there is much evidence to support the
notion that the Judeo-Christian tradition, with its rabbinical and priestly
hierarchy and its strict dogmatism (at least to the time of Martin Luther),70 is
66Steven Ozment, Protestants: The Birth of a Revolution . (New York: Doubleday, 1991), p. 213.
67James Madison, The Federalist No. 37 .
6°A position that Daniel Pipes and Bernard Lewis seem to support.
69Compare, for example, Thomas Jefferson's letters to John Adams of 1820 and 1823 in The Life and
Selected Writings of Thomas leffer^on. Adrienne Koch and William Teden, eds., (New York:
Random House, 1993), pp. 639-640, 644-645, and the Qur'an, 25: 45-54, 50: 6-10.
70
It should be noted that Jewish scriptural interpretation and norms for religious and social conduct
have remained somewhat more elastic, since the period of the Babylonian exile, than the
Christian dogmatism found throughout the greater part of the church's history. It was not until the
Reformation that there appears, outside the hierarchy of the church and its various monastic
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more antithetical to democratic political structures than the Orthodox (or Sunni)
Islamic tradition in which there is, theoretically, no priesthood with its
inevitable hierarchy of faith. 71
It is when religion performs the societal function of a political "ideology" (in
the Marxist sense of the word) that it becomes intolerant, stifling, and dictatorial
in nature. Some brief examples from the history of the Christian church may
shed more light on the subject. In its origin, the Christian religion was simply
the "good news" of salvation, forgiveness, and the love of one's fellows through
the beneficence of God. It became, however, after the collapse of Roman secular
authority, a politicized religion; an ideology to maintain the social order and to
suppress rebellious thoughts and the deeds that follow from them. 72 "As long as
Christianity was without secular interests and responsibilities, it left the beliefs
and speculations about the hereafter as free as they had been in antiquity. Yet
when the purely religious development of the new creed had come to an end
and the Church had become aware of, and willing to take over, political
responsibilities, she found herself confronted with a perplexity similar to the one
orders, a strong move toward interpretation and reinterpretation of scripture as it applies to social
and political life.
71
"Islam too [as in the monastic communities of dissidents from the hierarchy of the clerisy]
preaches the direct relation of individuals to the deity. But generally attempts at reformation are
quickly followed by a reversal, a b.icksliding to the earlier condition. Social pressures making for a
clerisy distinct from civil society are too strong." Gellner, Plough. Sword, and Book: The Structure
of Human History, p. 165.
72Despite the eternal philosophic.il debate over the priority of the vita contemplative! or the
vita activa
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and despite Goethe's upside-down attempt to marry the two with his Faustian theory
of action (that the deed is creativity, for how could the cosmos have been created out of thoughtless
chaos if this were not the case?), a theory, incidentally, that became an integral part of Marx's
revolutionary thesis ("Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, but the real
task is to alter it." Marx, Eleven Theses on Feuerbach ), it is my contention here that the idea most
often precedes the action rather thdn the reverse. The most efficient way to control deeds is to
control thoughts, and from Plato, the Church hierarchy, the Ulema and the Imams, to Joseph
Goebbels and George Orwell, it would appear that I am not alone in this view. Incidentally, the
above is one of the many contradictions found in Marx. If the new order or the "end of history" will
ultimately come about independent of action, then why the need for action to bring it about?
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that had given rise to Plato's political philosophy,"73 namely, how to ensure
authority and social order without resorting to violence?
The answer to this riddle, as pointed out above, is to make extensive use of
the most powerful symbols that the clerisy possesses: its monopoly on the sacred,
and the perception of its direct influence on the eternal salvation or, more
importantly, the eternal damnation of the individual. Through these powerful
symbols, the clerisy maintains the order of agrarian society, not by suppressing
the rebellious action or by pushing the social order towards a more productive
and/or fulfilling life in this world, but by suppressing any thought process that
would lead to a disturbance in the ideological basis of power.
In writing of the reasons for the formation of various sects within Christianity
after the sixteenth century explosion brought on by the Reformation, Thomas
Hobbes has this to say: "I confess I know very few controversies amongst
Christians of points necessary to salvation. They are the questions of authority
and power over the Church, or of profit, or of honour to churchmen, that for the
most part raise all the controversies."74 The reasons for the Reformation are
varied and complex, but one point stands out clearly: it was a rebellion of the
producers against the authority of the clerisy which, as long as it held sway, was a
primary (if not the primary) bar on the exit to the closed cycle of European,
agrarian societies. The economic Gulliver was beginning to awaken.
It is here that we see the development of the famed "Protestant work ethic" as
but a side effect of taking religion out of the exclusive hands of the clerisy thereby
destroying their monopoly on the sacred, and putting it into the hands of the
productive masses. The producers had good reason to be bitter about the idleness
and sloth of the clerisy which lived by the "bloody sweat" of the peasant and
73Arendt, Between Past and Future p. 132.
74Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth, or the Long Parliament, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990), p. 63.
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working men and women. That the clerisy had, over several centuries, hoarded
the wealth of the productive masses obviously engenders an opposing reaction
that religious men should also be productive men. However, "the Utopian
literature of the time indicates a clear preference for centralized, authoritarian
regimes in which no independent political entities or dissent are tolerated and
obedience is the most valued and praised trait of the good citizen. To Luther and
his contemporaries, something more basic than political freedom and equality
was at stake in the hierarchical ordering of home and society: the viability of life
itself."75
In this, we see the authoritarian nature of agrarian society, the logic of the
system if you will, persisting even though that order is in the process of change.
Hobbes and Luther, although they were not immediate contemporaries, were of
one mind regarding the sanctity of obedience and order in society. They were
both extremely fearful of the kinds of social and political disorder brought about
by the unhinging of the agrarian socioeconomic order in the time of the
Reformation. 76 However, they each took decidedly different approaches to the
problem.
To Hobbes, the best way to ensure the viability of the social existence of Man
was to merge the "Ecclesiasticall" and the "Civil," or the religious and the
political, into a single, monolithic and hierarchical institution. 77 "To the Luther
of the 1520's, [however,] the ^reat enemies of the age were the advocates of
absolute cultural uniformity, whose aim was to identify church and state, and
collapse religion and society together. On the one hand, they were the
magistrates and princes [i.e. the warrior elites of Agrarian society] who treated the
75Ozment, p. 143.
76For a particularly vivid account of the consequences of the social and political disorder brought
about by the Reformation, see Jon Swan, "Apocalypse at Munster," in Robert Cowley, ed.,
Experience of War. (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), pp. 93-109.
77See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan .
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Church and the soul as also their wards; on the other, they were the evangelical
fanatics who wanted to rule the world by the Sermon on the Mount, as the Pope
had earlier aspired to do by canon law. As long as those in power viewed the
sacred and the civic as coextensive realms, society would only oscillate between
attempts by each side to dominate the other."78 This, in effect, is the very essence
of the agrarian socioeconomic order; a perpetual oscillation between the warrior
elites and the clerisy, sometimes at odds with one another, and at other times
closely cooperating, but always needing each other, and always dominating and
exploiting the productive masses.
The clerisy maintains its monopoly on the sacred even as, in some cases,
agrarian communities grow to become prosperous agrarian empires and /or
literacy becomes more widespread, by means of language and the complexity of
canonical text and the laws derived from it. In these cases, the clerical and
"official" language of the society is the language of the conquerors or, more
specifically, the language of the elites among the conquerors, and while the
vanquished may become part and parcel of the larger whole of the empire, the
language of the sacred is incomprehensible to them. Furthermore, as time goes
by, even the "everyday" language of the conquering peoples may become distinct
from the sacred language of the canon and the language of the elite, again
rendering the rites of the sacred incomprehensible to the laity,79 which has the
78Ozment, pp. 126-127.
79Take, for example, the continued use of Latin as the language of the Catholic Church when, from
the early Middle Ages to the present, the vast majority of those under its sway had little or no
comprehension of that language. As an example more relevant to this thesis, consider the
differences, sometimes minute and sometimes vast, between the various languages and dialects of
the Muslim world and the language of the Quran which is utterly incomprehensible to some and, to
others, is "stuffy" and formalistic. Among the higher strata of agro-literate society it is clearly
advantageous to stress, sharpen, and accentuate the diacritical, differential, and monopolizable
traits of the privileged groups. The tendency of liturgical languages to become distinct from the
vernacular is very strong; it is as if literacy alone did not create enough of a barrier between cleric
and layman, as if the chasm between them had to be deepened, by making the language not merely
recorded in an inaccessible script, but also incomprehensible when articulated." Gellner, Nations
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happy side effect of instilling the awe of the unknown within the hearts of the
lay community.
The building of a complex canon provides not only a status marker for the
clerisy, but also provides a bulwark against prophetism. "In conservative and
ritualist societies [i.e. agrarian societies] there is no differentiation of orders; the
same socioreligious values pervade economics, politics, and private life. The
breakdown of conservatism by prophetism opens the way for increased
autonomy in each order of activity"80 and, consequently, breaks down the
authority of the clerisy. "Even in the absence of a prophetic challenge, [prophecy
being a direct challenge to priestly traditions and the magical elements surviving
in religious ritual by its strong appeal to the laity,] priests endeavor to systematize
established beliefs [in the form of an increasingly complex canon] in order to
protect their position against attack and to combat skepticism or indifference."81
Both the language barrier and the sheer complexity of the canon insure that the
clerisy remains a select group within the agrarian society even if admittance to it
is no longer based on lineage alone (which is usually the case).
This is of great importance, both to the warrior elites and to the clerisy, for the
maintenance of status boundary markers in this type of socioeconomic order.
An individual's language and culture are the status symbols in agrarian societies
that mark the elites as distinct from the rest of society. It is, therefore, beneficial
for the maintenance of the socioeconomic order to preserve the heterogeneity of
culture and language within it rather than to attempt to define political units in
terms of a homogeneous cultural grouping, as is the case (as will be discussed
below) in modern industrial societies. 82
and Nationalism, p. 11. See also, on the subject of the significance of canon formation, James A.
Sanders, From Sacred Story to Sacred Text . (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987).
80Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol. 2 . p. 273.
81 Bendix, p. 90.
82Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 11.
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One final point regarding the clerisy within the agrarian socioeconomic
structure. Since they produce no wealth themselves, and because it is
inconsistent with their doctrines and their place within society to forcibly take
subsistence and/or genuine wealth from the producers, one is left with the
question of how the clerisy maintains its material basis. The solution to this
problem is "voluntary" donations from the producers. "The best way [for the
producers] to escape violent confiscation [by the warrior elites] was to link one's
wealth to religion, seeking the protection of the sacred. Pious foundations of one
kind and another could benefit the original owner and donor, or could at least
help him retain the residue. So wealth flowed to the temple, the monastery, the
upkeep of a mosque school. It is almost meaningless to ask whether the faithful
benefactors were buying the favors of heaven, or merely escaping the rapacity of
the political /military thugs. They were doing both, fleeing robbery, and securing
merit both in this world and the next."83
As we have seen, the clerisy is violently opposed to cognitive innovation. On
the surface of things, however, it would seem that the other power group within
agrarian societies, the warrior elites, would seem to favor cognitive advance as a
means obtain the rudiments of a technological advantage on the battlefield. This
is an erroneous assumption. Cognitive advance and the accompanying
technological innovation is just as dangerous to the position of the warrior elites
as it is to the clerisy; for real and lasting cognitive advances can only take place in
the economic realm of the producers. It occurs, as we shall see in the following
discussion of modern industrial societies, when the economic Gulliver becomes
free from, and comes to dominate, the Lilliputian military /religious power bloc
that binds it within the structure of agrarian societies.
83Gellner, Plough. Sword and Book; The Structure of Human History , p. 103.
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Take, for example, the invention of the crossbow. By most accounts, the
crossbow was developed around 500 B.C.E.,84 but it did not make any significant
impact in Europe until the Medieval period. Why? The answer lies in the fact
that "when commoners on foot [i.e. producers] could so easily kill their social
betters, the fabric not only of warfare but of European society began to
fray...Military prepotency was no longer reserved for one class, a fact dramatized
when Richard the Lion-hearted himself was shot down by a crossbow as he
cavorted before a besieged castle. Rather quickly the Church [i.e.clerisy] stepped
into the breach. In 1139 [C.E.] the Second Lateran Council outlawed the use of the
crossbow among Christians (though not against Muslims). The Church was not
alone. The English aristocracy also banned the offending instrument in the
Magna Carta of 1215."85
In Gellner's words: "In a society of this kind [e.g. agrarian society], the surplus
accumulated by the producers, if not forcefully seized by the monopolists of
violence, is naturally channelled either into purchasing entry to the ranks of the
swordsmen or into enhancing the ritual equipment of the society. So, one way
or the other, the clerical-military elite benefits...Neither way, however, is the
surplus used to augment the productive equipment of society, or to enhance its
cognitive potential. The entire organization of society, in both its coercive and
ideological institutions, works against this being so. Almost everything in the
ethos, and in the balance of power of the society, generally militates against the
possibility of an explosive growth in either production or cognition." 861
It is also this ethos and balance of power within the agrarian society that tends
to make agrarian cities what Weber classified as "consumer cities" rather than
84See Hero's 399 B.C.E description of the gastroplietes (belly-bow) in Belopoeica .
85Robert L. O'Connell, "The Life and Hard Times of the Crossbow," in Robert Cowley, ed.,
Experiencp of War. (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), pp. 82-83.
^Gellner, Plough. Sword and Book; The Structure of Human History , p. 103.
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"producer cities." In this type of city, "the purchasing power of.. .large
consumers—and that means: of rentiers—determines the economic
opportunities of the resident artisans and traders. These large consumers can be
of very different types, depending upon the kind and sources of their incomes.
They may be officials spending their legal or illegal revenues, or manorial lords
and political power holders consuming their non-urban ground rents or other
more politically determined incomes in the city."87 This type of city is the direct
result of the warrior elites' consumption of the wealth exploited from the
producers. The ethos of the agrarian society, an ethos which disdains labor as
slavery to necessity and an unflattering status marker (i.e. it marks one as not
belonging to the warrior elite or clerical classes), in turn, encourages the
producers not to produce more, as is the case in Modern Industrial "producer
cities," but to escape from production altogether if and when they can afford to
do so. "This," observes Hannah Arendt, is "the solution of the well-known
puzzle in the study of the economic history of the ancient world that industry
developed up to a certain point, but stopped short of making progress which
might have been expected in view of the fact that thoroughness and capacity for
organization on a large scale is shown by the Romans in other departments, in
the public services and the army."88 The producers and, therefore, productive
growth and the development of the "producer city" are held in check and are the
captives of the logic of the agrarian socioeconomic order.
The sixth tendency of agrarian societies is that there is little upward social
mobility. One may either purchase entry into the ranks of the warrior elite (that
is, a producer may convert all or most of his economic resources, if he is
fortunate enough to have more than meager material resources, to means of
87Weber. Economy and Society, p. 1215.
88Arendt, The Human Condition, p 65.
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defense or coercion in order to avoid being plundered himself), attempt to join
the ranks of the clerisy, or one may become a valuable "client" of a member of
the elite on whose proverbial coattails one could ride.
In agrarian societies, the bonds between landlord and tenant serve as
prototypes of what first comes to mind when we think of patron/ client
relationships. According to Carl Lande, "a patron/client relationship is a vertical
dyadic alliance, i.e. a [direct and personal] alliance between two persons of
unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an
ally someone superior or inferior to himself."89 Given this definition, he goes
on to state that patron/ client systems tend to be pyramidal in structure with a
patron having several clients and being, in turn, the client of another, more
powerful patron.90 Using this line of reasoning, Thomas Carney has described a
principal difference between the socioeconomic structures of agrarian societies
and modern industrial societies. The former is "a society based on patronage, not
class stratification; so that little pyramids of power abound. ..Thus, [this type of]
society resembles a mass of little pyramids of influence, each headed by a major
family—or one giant pyramid headed by an autocrat—not the three-decker
sandwich of upper, middle, and lower classes familiar to us from [modern]
Industrial society."91
This accounts for the more prevalent vertical aspects of patron/client
relations, but this alone does not provide us with a full picture of the intricate
web of social ties involved in agrarian societies. Horizontal ties must be
considered as well. Of these, there are two basic types: the indirect and the direct.
The indirect, horizontal patron /client relationship can best be described as a
89Carl Lande in Schmidt et al., Friends. Followers, and Factions. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), p. XX.
90Ibid, p. XXI.
^Thomas Carney, The Shape of the Fast: Models and Antiquity, (Lawrence, KS: Coronado Press,
1975), p. 63.
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"brokerage." "Brokers" are individuals who hold high honor in the eyes of two
equal competing parties that resolve conflicts between them on a personal,
double-dyadic level. The direct, horizontal patron/client relationship can best be
described by the Roman term amicitia (loosely translated as "friendship"). This
is a relationship of constant "give and take" in which two individuals of equal
social status do each other favors and repay those favors on a continuing basis so
that the "tab" is never paid in full, and the two individuals are held together by
honor and mutual interest. It is a system of alternating patronage and clientage
between two equals. In this way, two equal individuals or groups of equals may
collectively move up the socioeconomic "ladder" of agrarian societies.
In summary, agrarian societies are an uneasy balance of power between the
warrior/ruling elites and the clerisy. The warrior/ruling elites have not the
means to impose order by coercion alone and, moreover, they generally remain
cowed by the theological doctrine of the clerisy. They therefore permit the
existence of the clerisy as a legitimizing force. The warriors support the clerisy in
its suppression of cognitive growth in return for a social order that is amenable
to themselves. However, what happens when the warrior elites acquire the
means of coercion that is capable of maintaining the order of things without the
necessity of the legitimizing force of the clerisy, and without permitting the
producers to escape domination? They do so and, as we shall see below, this is
precisely the situation that can be found in a number of Arab states today.
Furthermore, within the simple division of labor necessitated by the labor-
intensive nature of the agrarian mode of production, the elite elements or classes
are relatively closed to the productive masses, generating a system of patronage
as one of the few viable avenues to upward social mobility. Lastly, whether the
warrior elites or the clerisy or both (as is most often the case) hold the reins of
40
power, agrarian societies are, with few exceptions,92 ruled in a authoritarian
manner with sharp, vertical social stratification. These societies are more or less
a "closed cycle" within which the individual actors or families and groups of
actors may, and quite often do, violently change roles, but the socioeconomic
structure tends to remain in tact.
C MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES
If it is, in fact, the case that agrarian societies are a "closed cycle" of violent,
periodical upheaval in which the names may change but the roles remain the
same, then how is it possible for a new socioeconomic order (namely, modern
industrial) to emerge? Everything within the agrarian socioeconomic structure
militates against the emancipation of the producers from the tyranny of the
military/religious edifice. However, this emancipation did occur, spontaneously
and indigenously, in one area, but one area only: western Europe or, to be more
specific, England and Holland. 93 All other modern industrial societies are the
result of direct colonization or the demonstration effect of the great, and
heretofore undreamed of, wealth and power of this type of socioeconomic order.
This is not intended as a "racist" or "Euro-centric" statement nor is it meant to
imply that non-European civilizations have no intrinsic value of their own, for
the Western Europeans themselves had no inkling of the future that they were
92The ancient Hellenic experience with democracy in Athens, Syracuse, and a few of the other city-
states is perhaps the only exception. It is important to note, however, that those societies were
primarily mercantile, relying on trade rather than strictly agriculture to provide wealth. The
example of Sparta is more typical.
9
^The answer to the riddle of why the demonstration effect of the English and Dutch
industrialization was so much more immediately potent in the rest of Western Europe than
elsewhere in the world could conceivably take several volumes to fully explore. However, I
believe that the answer lies principally in the commonality of Western European peoples (English
protestations aside); their common religious roots in the Church of Rome, their common linguistic
roots and alphabet, their close physical proximity to one another, and their nearly uniform
development of absolutist states out of the feudal system that laid much of the groundwork for the
emergence of the nation-state.
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creating; they acted out of ignorance, not design. Indeed, "the transformation
was too profound, and too contrary and too offensive to the established pattern
of thought and values, to be understood in advance."94 Had it been understood
and appreciated for what it was, it would surely have been, wherever possible,
crushed at the outset. "By the time understanding came, it was too late to try and
throttle it."95 The previous statement, therefore, is intended merely to highlight
the unique nature of modern industrial society and the tremendous odds against
which it originally came into being.
To postulate that had the breakthrough from the agrarian to the modern
industrial order not taken place in Western Europe, then it would have
happened elsewhere in due course is to become a prisoner of the linear view of
history and it is, at best, wishful thinking. This line of thought (if you will
pardon the expression) fails to take into account the one piece of key evidence:
that for thousands of years, men had lived in agrarian societies throughout the
world, societies whose general structures I have outlined above that had
experienced virtually no structural and change whatsoever in all of that time.
Why such a transformation happened at all is still somewhat of a mystery
despite numerous, intriguing explorations of the subject.96 However, it is not
my primary intention to discuss the reasons for the transformation from
Agrarian to Modern Industrial socioeconomic structures, but to discuss the
consequences of such a transformation.
The most important feature in the structure of modern industrial societies is
that the productive masses have not simply escaped the tyranny of the
military /religious edifice, but have turned the tables and come to, if not
94Gellner, Plough. Sword and Book. The Structure of Human History , p. 171. Emphasis is mine.
95Ibid.
96See, for example, Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins
of Dictatorship and Democracy . Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
among others.
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dominate, then to largely envelop the military and religious groups within
themselves. Through the examination of the dominant values and mores of a
society, it is possible to gain a reasonably clear understanding of which groups
and which activities are held in the highest esteem within the socioeconomic
structure. In the agrarian order, where the warrior elites and the clerisy were
dominant, it was martial ability, honor, loyalty, obedience, and knowledge of the
sacred which were held in the highest esteem. In modern industrial societies, it
is labor and innovative production that is honored and even glorified.
"The sudden, spectacular rise of labor from the lowest, most despised position
[the position that it occupied in the Agrarian order] to the highest rank, as the
most esteemed of all human activities," did not begin, as Arendt argues, "when
Locke discovered that labor is the source of all property."97 It began when the
economic classes gained supremacy over the entire social order, naturally raising
labor and/or the act of production (which are not necessarily the same given the
distinction between "work" and "labor") over martial ability and theological or
philosophical knowledge as the most praised attribute, the very expression of the
humanity of Man. Most of Marx's (perhaps the foremost spokesman of the
producers) work flows from his definition of Man as animal laborans which, in
turn, follows from the rise of the producers and that activity which defines them.
It is ironic that Marx's ideas, even prior to their distortion through the work of
Lenin, represent, in effect, the "ideology" (a term of contempt for Marx),98 or the
system of ideas which are presumed to define reality to justify the dominance of
a particular group, of the producers.
It is, therefore, apparent that the economic realm has become paramount and
with it we see a growing dominance of the scientific mode of thought. This
97Arendt. The Human Condition, p 101.
98See, among others, Preface to the second edition of Kapital and Marx/Engels, The German
Ideology. Part I.
4 3
mode of thought, having its basis in the rational investigation of the nature of
things in antiquity, was never allowed by the clerisy of the agrarian order to be
free of the social constraints which prevented it from being applied to the social
and economic structure, to Man himself and his values. As we have already
seen, this would have been catastrophic for the agrarian order as one of the
fundamental principles of rational investigation is that "nothing is necessarily
connected with anything else. [One] must separate all separables in thought, and
then consult the fact to see whether the separated elements are, contingently,
joined together."99 This includes, especially when the subject of investigation is
Man himself, the imperative that facts not only be separated from other facts, but
that facts be separated from values as well. 100 If the Earth is not at the center of
the universe, then so be it. Not only will the modern industrial order refrain
from suppressing that fact, but its discovery is celebrated as a "breakthrough," a
triumph of Man's reason, and another step toward understanding and
conquering the ultimate foe of the economic realm: nature.
Unlike the military/religious hierarchy of the agrarian order, the producers
are primarily concerned not with the subjugation of the masses at home and
enemies on the battlefield to bring wealth, status and prosperity to themselves,
but with the subjugation of nature to provide these things. "Indeed, from the
moment men think scientifically, the chief activity of collectivities ceases to be
the war of man against man [although this continues to occur] and becomes the
struggle of Man against nature, the systematic exploitation of natural
resources." 101 This systematic exploitation of natural resources, as opposed to
"Gellner, Plough. Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History , p. 64.
100
It is in Machiavelli's discourses that we can see the scientific mode of thought, in all of its
clinical rationality, begin to emerge from its long imprisonment within the agrarian order. Well
before Hume's analysis of the philosophical consequences of the phenomenon, the separation of
facts from facts and facts from values is clearly evident in Machiavelli's sometimes shocking
political counsels on the "practical' exercise of power.
101 Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought. Vol. 1. p. 75.
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other factors such as the "moral" and "material" density of a given community
as proposed by Durkheim, 102 is the principal motivation behind the complex
division of labor that occurs in modern industrial societies. In fact, one could
even say that it is the raison d'etre of this type of socioeconomic order.
It is here also that we see the subtle shift from the Platonic to the Cartesian
mode of thought. In the Platonic world, knowledge of reality was derived from
the Transcendent whereas in the Cartesian world, the Transcendent can only be
comprehended through knowledge of reality or nature. We can see this subtle
shift taking place through the life and work of Johannes Kepler who, in 1571,
labored tirelessly on his hypothesis that the planets travel in elliptical orbits in
order to discover and understand "how God worked." The consequences of this
shift in emphasis are drastic and profound for the ordering of society.
The scientific mode of thought moves cognition from being primarily non-
referential to being primarily referential. Empirical facts become free and
independent of social values. Indeed, facts come to dominate values rather than
the reverse. 103 We can observe the subtle changes taking place which move a
universal conception of society and the cosmos from the primarily non-
referential to the primarily referential in the thought of Auguste Comte. He
borrowed Bossuet's "elevated perspective [of] the whole of the history of society,"
formed from Bossuet's theological perspective (i.e. non-referential), and put
forward the concept of a "single design" of history with a twist. It was no longer
a transcendent being, Forms or Ideas which provided that "single design," but
l02 See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society. (New York: The Free Press, 1984), pp.
200-223.
103
It should be noted here that primarily through the influence of a superficial and vulgarized
version of the thought of Nietzsche on Western Modern Industrial societies (particularly in the
United States), the concept of "values" as being prior to facts has gained increasing adherence and
has become an increasing threat to the foundations of Democracy. But this is another vast subject
for study and reflection which, while it is particularly relevant to the future of Modern Industrial
societies, it is not entirely relevant to the current discussion of the bases of these types of
socioeconomic orders.
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the progress of the human mind. Comte "concluded that the positivist [or
scientific] method—based on observation, experimentation, and the
establishment of general laws [governing the natural world]—must be extended
to areas which were still entrusted to theology, i.e., to a method which claims to
discover the underlying causes of phenomena and to locate the final causes in
transcendent beings."104
This is not to say that religion disappears from the scene entirely. To the
contrary, religion becomes "compartmentalized" into one particular aspect of life
and is transformed into a "civics lesson" or social norms for behavior, much as it
had been in antiquity. It ceases to be an all-encompasing political ideology
because it no longer has the unquestioning confidence of the masses. "The
incompatibility of modern science with traditional beliefs does not lie in any
specific scientific findings, alJ of which can be absorbed by religious beliefs for the
reason that they will never be able to answer the questions which religion raises
[i.e. ends, in every sense]. ..this incompatibility [lies], rather, in the conflict
between a spirit of doubt and distrust which can ultimately trust only what it has
made itself, and the traditional unquestioning confidence in what has been
given..." 105
The social order is, therefore, taken off the "gold standard" of the
Transcendent. If Man's knowledge of the natural world is no longer derived
from the Transcendent but from his own exploration and investigation, then he
is impelled by the logic of this mode of thought to examine and re-examine
every fact, every value and, in short, every facet of the social and natural worlds
to establish its validity; the kind of hard and fast validity that can no longer be
established by the Transcendent of the clerisy, but must be established by rational
104 Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought. Vol. 1. p. 95.
105 Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 31.
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calculation and by general agreement. "The modern social order is founded on a
rejection of the naturalistic thesis insofar as values, beliefs, and indeed society
itself came to be seen as open to change, hence as requiring new forms of
legitimation." 106
This new form of legitimation is the ideal of consent. The clerisy, no longer
holding its monopoly on the sacred as, over the course of time, the world
becomes "disenchanted" and increasingly devoid of the sacred, 107 is incapable of
providing the legitimation necessary to ensure authority and social order in any
settled community without resorting to violence, whether that community be
agrarian or modern industrial in nature. In this situation, no one individual or
group of individuals has a monopoly on Truth. In order for a truth to be
accepted as valid, it must pass muster in (to use Oliver Wendell Holmes' phrase)
"the free marketplace of ideas." What else, therefore, can legitimacy be based
upon other than consent?
Incidentally, while this is one of the major factors that militate for democratic
government in modern industrial societies, it is also one of this type of society's
major problems. The scientific mode of thought, once it has come to dominate
and pervade society through cognitive advance in the economic/technological
realm, leads to conclusions that are sometimes absurd, and at other times,
extremely disturbing. First, if there is no such thing as absolute truth, then truth
becomes relative and a matter of opinion. There is a subtle but tangible feeling
in Modern Industrial societies that the whole world is becoming unhinged, that
the wheels are coming off. This is a direct result of the fact/ value separation and
106 Cascardi, p. 42.
107
"A belief in magic. ..makes sense if it is assumed that the whole world is brimful of powers that
act in a manner beyond human comprehension." Bendix, p. 203. However, when human
comprehension begins to succeed in unraveling the great mysteries of the natural world, belief in the
power of the sacred and the magical, mystical qualities that surround it is gradually eroded. The
world becomes entirely "profane."
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the natural world being taken off the "gold standard" of the Transcendent, and it
raises fears that the world is not governed by any authoritative point of view. 108
If truth is only a matter of opinion, then let the stronger opinion prevail!
Relativism and deconstructionism are the common result.
Plato clearly anticipated the mental perplexities resulting from relativism in
Statesman . "There is a. ..postulate on which we must insist, and it is this: 'Excess
and deficiency are measurable not only in relative terms but also in respect of
attainment of a norm or due measure.' For if we cannot first gain assent to this
postulate, we are bound to fail if we advance the claim that a man possesses
statecraft, or indeed that a man possesses any other of the special forms of
knowledge that function in human society." 109 In other words, if the greatness
or deficiency of an object, an idea, of morality or of men is measurable only as
relative to others of these, then we cannot possibly know anything. We become
lost in the shifting sands of our futile attempts at definition and redefinition
until the whole of the world external to the individual becomes utterly
meaningless. The individual's perspective, and his opinions based on that
perspective, becomes the most meaningful currency of the modern intellectual
exchange, and knowledge as such goes by the wayside.
The scientific mode of thought, when it is applied to society, can and does
produce a "rationalization" of labor and bureaucracies organized around a
means-ends rationality for optimum efficiency, however, this mode of thought
is rather limited to the economic /technological field even if we insist (as we so
often do) on rationalizing everything else in society, actions which are based
purely on sentiment, not reason or logic. "Reason...may be able to tell us what is
108Cascardi, p. 126.
109 Plato, Statesman. 284b-c.
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the case, but it is powerless to tell us what to want; it stands mute with regard to
ends."110
Modern industrial societies are defined primarily by a mode of production
that results in a complex, rather than a simple, division of labor. As mentioned
above, this complex division of labor comes about as a result of the dominance of
the economic over the military and religious spheres, and the consequent,
systematic battle waged by the producers against nature for the exploitation of its
resources. The scientific mode of thought also engenders the most efficient
means of achieving that end. Just as each fact/ fact and fact/ value cluster is
broken down and dissected into its constituent, fundamental components, each
labor process is broken down and divided in minute detail. Each of these details
is separated from the others and becomes an area of "specialty." Each area of
specialty, however, is based not on lineage, kinship ties or social position, but on
education and training (areas which are much more within the control of the
individual). "In the modern world, society no longer prescribes in advance what
the role of individuals, and what the truth of their lives shall be. This meaning
is no longer recognized as a pre-established norm or accepted as prior to the
individual. Rather, it must be created and affirmed by acts of individual
choice." 111
Furthermore, "if cognitive growth presupposes that no element is
indissolubly linked a priori to any other, and that everything is open to
rethinking, then economic and productive growth requires exactly the same of
human activities and hence of human roles. Roles become optional and
110 Cascardi, p. 37. Man is guided and propelled by feelings when it comes to the ends which he
pursues and he is, therefore, inevitably and unalterably irrational regardless of the logic and
rationality of the means he uses to achieve those ends. On this subject, see, in particular, Thomas
Hobbes, Behemoth, or the Long Parliament, and Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society. (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 193^).
m Cascardi, p. 97.
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instrumental. The old stability of the social role structure is simply incompatible
with growth and innovation. Innovation means doing new things, the
boundaries of which cannot be the same as those of the activities they replace [in
the agrarian order]."112 In fact, individuals in modern industrial societies tend to
become role-players not onlv in their public lives but in their private lives as
well; being a husband or wife, father or mother, and even being male or female
becomes optional. It is of no minor significance that the consummate role-
players, those who can most easily and gracefully move from one role to the
next, donning and doffing personalities and even sexualities as if they were
clothing, are the most popular and well-known figures in modern industrial
societies; these are, of course, actors.
As a result of this shifting of roles and the economic and social mobility, social
boundaries tend to become ephemeral, and where they exist at all, they are on
the basis of the level of education and training in the cultural idiom of the
society that an individual attains. A prime example is the Ford assembly line
where each worker becomes a cog in the labor machine that has a specific task to
perform, and the efficiency of the operation is thereby enhanced.
Another, perhaps better, example is the formation of rational, legalistic
bureaucracies. This is opposed to the kind of "traditional bureaucracies" defined
by Weber which have as their basis "the sanctity of age-old rules and powers"
and loyalty to the person of the ruler rather than to abstract laws. Within these
rational, legalistic bureaucracies, each individual has "a clearly defined sphere of
competence subject to impersonal [or abstract] rules; a rationally established
hierarchy; a regular system of appointment on the basis of free contract, and
orderly promotion; [and] technical training as a regular requirement." 113 Weber
112 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 24.
113 Weber. Economy and Society, pp. 226, 228-229.
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theorized that "everywhere bureaucratization foreshadows mass democracy..." 114
Why? Because when put into use, if it is to be effective, it must have a "leveling"
effect on society "in the interest of the broadest possible basis for recruitment in
terms of technical competence...The dominant norms are concepts of
straightforward duty without regard to personal considerations. Everyone is
subject to formal equality of treatment; that is, everyone in the same empirical
situation." 115
It is in the interest of this broadest possible basis for recruitment that
education in the cultural idiom of the society must become homogeneous. The
high culture must become universalized, and every member of the society
becomes part of the clerisy sans absolutist pretensions linked to doctrine. They
all must speak the same language and understand the same set of social rules in
order to function as more or less interchangeable parts of the economic machine.
"Universal literacy and a high level of numerical, technical and general
sophistication are among [the complex division of labor's] functional
prerequisites. Its members are and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one
activity to another, and must possess that generic training which enables them to
follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation." 116
Cultural heterogeneity no longer serves the stability of the social order as it
did in the agrarian societies by providing status markers. Indeed, in the modern
industrial socioeconomic order, cultural heterogeneity is intolerable because it
necessarily limits the mobility and interchangability of individuals in the
various roles and "specialties" of the economic machine thereby throwing the
proverbial monkey wrench into its smooth-flowing gears. 117 Status markers are
114 Ibid, p. 226.
115 Ibid, p. 225.
116 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 35.
117As an aside, Tocqueville speculated that one of the results of this economic and social mobility,
and the hope or expectation of each individual of rising in the social hierarchy, was a belief in the
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provided by wealth and/or increased levels of education. "Nowadays people can
only live in units defined by a shared culture, [which are] internally mobile and
fluid. Genuine cultural pluralism ceases to be viable under [modern industrial]
conditions." 118
Another result of the complex division of labor is that both kinship groups
and patron/ client relationships are broken down and become less and less of a
factor in labor-oriented relationships (although they do not disappear entirely).
First, the complex division of labor takes away the raison d'etre of both these
types of relationships. Extended families are no longer a requirement for
economic success as they were in the agrarian order; one can achieve sustenance
and can gain wealth without the necessity of the extended kinship group
working the family plot of land or the family trade. And, because the hierarchy
within the complex division of labor tends to become a meritocracy, based on
individual skills and performance abilities, 119 the need for patron/client
relationships dwindles.
Second, the social and economic mobility produced and necessitated by the
complex division of labor causes an increasing atomization of society which,
therefore, erodes these types of relationships. Individuals, without their kinship
ties and possessing earned educational skills, enter the "work force" as
individuals. In their work related roles they must be able to function by an
unlimited perfectibility of Man. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America . J. P. Mayer, ed.,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 452-454.
118 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 55.
119 Although the complex division of labor does melt away the necessity of patron/client
relationships for upward social and economic mobility, it does not remove the need for this type of
relationship entirely. The patron/client relationship is still operative to some degree and, even
where it does not exist, the perception that it does exist plays an important role in easing the
unbearable social tensions that would arise from a pure meritocracy. "The irony [of a meritocracy in
Modern Industrial societies] arises from the fact that if everyone has a position commensurate with
his merits, those who occupy the lowest positions can no longer blame fate or injustice. If all men
were convinced that the social order was fair, then the latter would, in a certain sense and for
certain persons, be intolerable." Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought. Vol. 1. p. 92.
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abstract set of rules governing their actions which make no place for personal or
familial considerations if the system is to function well. All members of the
kinship group do not remain in one geographical location. As individuals, their
changing roles and positions requires their mobility, and families may be spread
over a very wide area indeed. In Gellner's words: "When everyone has become
a Mamluk [i.e. has specialized training and has been separated from kinship
groups in conjunction with that training], no special Mamluk class predominates
in the bureaucracy. At long last the bureaucracy can recruit from the population
at large, without needing to fear the arrival of dozens of cousins as unwanted
attachments of each single new entrant." 120
When this situation occurs, the old structures which had once provided each
individual with his identity, dignity and material security, in short, with his
sense of belonging, are eroded. He must now depend on his education and his
part in the shared literate culture to provide these things. 121 He becomes not
only conscious of culture, but absolutely dependent on it for his own sense of
identity and well being. Nationalism is then born, and strives continuously and
often violently "to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with
its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that." 122
In summary, the modern industrial socioeconomic order, once it has come
into being, produces social realities that are conducive to democratic
government. First, when the primarily economic and technical "scientific mode
of thought" comes to dominate cognition, as it does when the economic realm of
the producers pervades all ot society, then there can be no absolutes in the
spiritual and social worlds. The world becomes "disenchanted" or "profane" and
devoid of the sacred. Legitimacy, the necessary element to any stable
120 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism , p. 37.
121 Ibid, p. 85.
122 Ibid, p. 43.
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sociopolitical order, can no longer be provided by the clerisy under these
circumstances. It can only be derived from the consent of the governed.
Second, the systematic exploitation af nature, once it has become the
paramount activity of societv, produces a "rationalization" of not only the
economic realm, but also the social realm as well, since the two are now
completely interdependent and coextensive with one another. This, in turn,
leads to the generation of abstract rules or laws to govern the functioning of the
economic machine which provide "civil society" shelter from any capriciousness
on the part of the government that might endanger the enterprise of the
productive masses.
Third, because individuals in this type of order are socially and economically
mobile, there develops an egalitarian ethos in society. Anyone, with the right
education and training, may perform any and every role or function within the
socioeconomic machine and, furthermore, those roles are (in fact, must be)
governed by abstract rules which are devoid of personal considerations and
prejudices; rules or laws which are, in short, completely egalitarian.
Lastly, the complex division of labor in modern industrial societies erodes the
traditional social fabric of the agrarian order123 which provided individuals with
their sense of identity and belonging. The vacuum is filled by the consciousness
of the shared culture which has become synonymous with the sociopolitical
order; or, to be more succinct, the vacuum has been filled by nationality as the
passport to participate in social and political life of the community. Nationalism
and all-inclusive citizenship for those who hold this passport become
unavoidable by-products of this type of order. All of these factors predispose
l^There has never been a case, th.it I am aware of, in which a society made the leap from the
hunter /gatherer to the modern industrial socioeconomic order without first being a predominantly
agrarian society. In this sense, and in this sense only, the "stages" that have been proposed here
are indeed a linear progression. However, evolution is not guaranteed, and "stages" may become
the closed-cycle discussed above.
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(rather than force) modern industrial societies toward democratic government,
and provide the necessary prerequisites for the formation of that type of political
regime.
When Barrington Moore reached the conclusion, "No bourgeois, no
democracy,"124 he was correct, but only superficially so. It is not only the Middle
Class or the Capitalists, however one defines the term "bourgeoisie," but the
entire productive mass of modern industrial society within a complex division
of labor that militates for democracy. The consent required for political
legitimacy after the scientific mode of thought has permeated the society through
the dominance of the economic over the military and religious realms; the
mobility of the individual and the consequent abstract laws and egalitarian ethos;
and the nature of the all-inclusive citizenship of nationality with inherent
political interests; all of these factors make democracy a possibility in the modern
industrial socioeconomic order.
One final note on modern industrial societies: As noted at the beginning of
this section, the autonomous and indigenous transformation from the agrarian
to the modern industrial socioeconomic order occurred only in parts of Western
Europe, and all other modern industrial societies (including the rest of Western
Europe) are the result of either direct colonization (as is the case in North
America and Australia) or the demonstration effect (as is the case in Japan and
Russia). However, the demonstration effect is not a static condition, and the
scientific mode of thought, with all that follows from it, is constantly making
inroads in areas of the world where it has not been dominant in the past.
Indeed, the crux of Western European civilization, the period which laid the
groundwork for the formation of the original modern industrial order: the
124 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy , (Boston: Beacon Press,
1966), p. 418.
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Italian Renaissance, was largely the result of "a deliberate revival and imitation
of one civilization by another, across its entire range of civic and cultural
life..."^
It is, on the other hand, a dicey situation at best when this way of thinking is
injected into an agrarian socioeconomic structure that at once embraces the tools
produced by innovation and fights tooth and nail against that very same
innovation, as all agrarian orders are want to do. It tends to produce a large set of
variations and distortions of the original "model", some of which are beneficial,
most of which are destructive. And it would also seem, based on the historical
evidence, that the greater the time delay between the development of the
original modern industrial society and all later developments along those lines,
the greater the variations and distortions in the developing society. The Arab
world is a prime example of precisely this sort of distorted change.
125 Anderson, p. 149. Emphasis is mine.
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III. ARAB SOCIOECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN PERSPECTIVE
In discussing 12th century Arab regimes, Albert Hourani has this to say:
"In moments of fear or hardship, the whole population of the city might be
disturbed. Moved perhaps by popular preachers denouncing oppression and
holding out the vision of a just Islamic order, mobs would break into the suq,
merchants shut their shops, and some spokesman of the people would bring to
the ruler complaints against his officials, or against merchants suspected of
causing an artificial scarcity of bread. Faced with such a movement, the ruler
might adjust his policy to satisfy some of the demands; officials would be
dismissed or executed, the storehouses of the grain merchants opened. The
market would open again, the coalition of forces dissolve, but the urban mass
would still be there, appeased or controlled for the moment, but as far as ever
from a just Islamic order.
"
12fl
The chain of events described here bears a striking resemblance to much of the
recent political crises in the Arab world. 127 As we shall see, this point is
illustrative of the fact that, despite the modernist pretensions of many of the
ruling elites in the Arab world with their "revolutionary" and/or "socialist"
agendas, and despite a great deal of social and economic change over the last 150
years, the basically agrarian structure ( i.e. the domination of the
126 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples. (New York: Warner Books, 1991), p. 137.
127The Egyptian bread riots of the late 197()'s bear the closest resemblance, but the rising of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, the Shi'a uprisings in southern Iraq, and the recent political struggle
in Algeria, while the outcomes were quite different, also bear a resemblance to the above chain of
events and correspond to the yearning for a more just order yet to be achieved.
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military /religious edifice over the economic mass) of Arab societies has
remained relatively constant.
In fact, the Arab world seems to be allergic to all things modern, including the
notions of "pure" socialism and /or democracy at the nation-state level. "It is
true that, in the last few decades, there has been a tremendous move toward
modernization in the Arab world, greater in certain regions than others. But to
say that the Arab world has become modern in its sociopolitical and economic
structures; its thought; its sciences and arts; its values, attitudes and behavior;
and the lives of its individuals is a gross overstatement." 128
In order to gain perspective in understanding the current state of Arab
socioeconomic structures, it is necessary to briefly outline some salient points on
the internal development of those structures as well as their external, symbiotic
relationship with the Western world. Before doing so, however, the discussion
in the previous chapter regarding the existence of socioeconomic stages only as
ideal types must be reempha sized. The socioeconomic structures of the Arab
world contain elements of alJ three of the stages that I have proposed. It is in the
blending together of these elements that we see the unique nature of Arab
socioeconomic structures as compared to these structures elsewhere. This,
however, is not to say that Arab socioeconomic structures do not fit the general
pattern of any of the ideal types described above. They do, in fact, conform most
closely to the agrarian stage in their political, social, and economic patterns and,
moreover, it is precisely this blending in of elements of the other two stages that
serves to amplify and to distort certain characteristics of the agrarian order.
128 Issa J. Boullata, "Challenges to Arab Cultural Authenticity," in Hisham Sharabi, ed., The Next
Arab Decade. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 147.
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A. SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
In the historical circumstances of Islam's appearance in the world in the 7th
century, the majority of those peoples that we would sum under the heading of
"Arabs" were pastoral, tribal groups exhibiting the primary characteristics of the
hunter/gatherer socioeconomic structure outlined above. They were
polytheistic, patriarchical, warlike, more or less egalitarian among the male
patriarchs, and held in order by a strong honor and shame moral system. With
this in mind, it is clear that part of the genius of Islam is that it sought to create a
universal tribe: the umma (as compared to the much more exclusive character of
Judaism, for instance). The strong emphasis on the interests of the group and
the just battles to be fought tor it, on the principle of consultation, on the equality
of believers; these are some of the dictums of tribal organization. The much
heralded concepts of political consultation and egalitarianism, which are central
to democratic government, are very much present in Islam as a result of the
universal tribe paradigm. However, these concepts wither on the vine when
Arab socioeconomic structures become primarily agrarian rather than
hunter/gatherer in nature.
As to whether the prophetic verse of Muhammad was divinely inspired or
was the result of the "demonstration effect" of the other great monotheistic
religions is highly controversial and, as with most things that are highly
controversial, we can never know the truth of the matter. However, one thing is
clear: from its very inception, Islam was defined in terms of its relationship to
not only polytheism but to the other monotheistic religions. 129 This provides us
129 See, in particular, the Qur'an, 3: i -63, 4: 171, 5: 59-66, 6: 20, 11: 110, among numerous other
examples.
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with one of our first keys to understanding the dynamic interplay between the
Arab and Western worlds.
If we "fast-forward" to the age of the great Arab empires in the 8th-14th
centuries, we can clearly see the development of the agrarian type of structure.
The relatively close-knit tribal, hunter/gatherer socioeconomic formations of the
conquerors, once they become settled communities in the pre-existing cities or
build their own cities (as was the case with Baghdad, Cairo, Kufah, and a host of
others), gives way, as it must, to the simple division of labor of agrarian societies.
We see the development of a specialized clerisy (the Ulema) whose liturgical
language, already distinct from the heterogeneous languages and dialects of the
vanquished (who, by the wav, we would now also sum under the heading of
"Arabs"), is distinct to the elites of the society.
When the leadership of the umma passed into settled, agrarian communities
at the time of the founding of the Umayyad dynasty in 661 C.E., this is when the
written word of Islam becomes important, 130 and the ulema, those who teach,
interpret and administer the Shari'a and are the guardians of the elaborated
norms of social behavior, develop as a distinct clerisy. The religion then begins
to take on a whole new function in society. It has become a means of
legitimation of coercion rather than personal salvation; hierarchy and power
rather than community and brotherhood. One of the reasons for the durability
of the ulema as a distinct clerisy is the explicitly stated position that Muhammad
was the final prophet or "seal of the prophets." "By firmly closing the door, in
principle, to further additions to the revealed doctrine, [Islam] enormously
strengthens the hand of those who have access to the delimited truth through
130By most accounts, the Qur'an achieved its final written form around the time of Uthman in 650
C.E.
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literacy and who use it as a charter of legitimacy. They cannot be outflanked by
new revelations." 131
It is at this time that we also see the consolidation of a warrior elite which
governs by the power of the sword as well as the legitimizing force of the ulema.
As with agrarian societies in general, there is no room in this type of
sociopolitical arrangement for egalitarianism or consultation. These concepts
are, by their very nature, destructive to the agrarian order. This, however, has a
twist to it which is rather unique to the Arab world. The warrior elites maintain
what Durkheim would term the "mechanical solidarity" of their tribal,
hunter/gatherer roots over and above the "organic solidarity" of the cities that
they rule. 132
From the beginning of the Arab age of empire with the Umayyad dynasty in
the 7th and particularly the early 8th centuries, when the princes were banished
to the desert in order to maintain the martial skills and self-reliance
characteristic of nomadic tribes, to the foundation and formation of new empires
out of the old, we see the recurring pattern of ruling, warrior elites either
attempting to retain their nomadic roots or being overthrown and replaced by
nomadic warriors from outside the society- It is in this way that the warrior
elites remained a special stratum of Arab, agrarian societies.
Their solidarity, cohesiveness, and martial superiority gave them a virtual
monopoly on the means of effective coercion, and with the legitimizing support
of the Ulema who, while "not very powerful in deciding between one ruler or
dynasty and another, were most influential in determining the general nature of
society," 133 the nomadically oriented warrior elites were able to dominate the
agrarian structure of Arab societies. It became "generally accepted that power was
131 Gellner, Muslim Soripry. p. 23.
132 See Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, pp. 31-87.
133 Gellner, Muslim Society, p. 115.
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acquired by the sword... It could, however, become legitimate authority only if it
was used to maintain the Shari'a and therefore the fabric of virtuous and
civilized life." 134
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the agrarian societies cannot survive
without the double-edged sword of protection and subjugation offered by the
warrior elites. "At the same time, however, the military and administrative
equipment available to the civilization [which, as pointed out in the previous
chapter, cannot be improved upon without upsetting the proverbial apple cart of
the agrarian order] does not allow the state to dominate the countryside
effectively, particularly given the arid and /or mountainous nature of the terrain
[in the Middle East] and the pastoral ecology encouraged by it." 135 This state of
affairs leaves the door open to the development of tribal opposition and, if that
opposition is strong enough, to the overthrow of the current stratum of warrior
elites by a new group whose cohesiveness and martial abilities have not been
"corrupted" by the soft ways of the city.
This is part of the explanation for the mixture of elements of both the
hunter/gatherer and the agrarian socioeconomic structures which is evident
throughout the history of the Arab world. Even as these structures become more
and more agrarian in nature, and there was a corresponding growth in the
predominance of unsymmetrical, patronage relationships, there was, and
continues to be, a continuing influence of the hunter/ gatherer, patriarchical
kinship ties. The social constants that are prevalent throughout the Arab world
include: "a strong urban orientation; a corresponding disdain for the peasant
[and pastoral] way of life and for manual labor; sharp social, geographic, and
economic stratification; political instability and a history of weak states;. ..rigid
134 Hourani, p. 144.
l-^Gellner, Muslim Society, p. 80.
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sexual segregation;. ..strong emphasis on shifting, ego-centered, non-corporate
coalitions; [and] an honor-and-shame syndrome which defines both sexuality
and personal reputation." 136
If we study the above listing closely, it becomes apparent that the social
constants of the Arab world (and, indeed, most of the Mediterranean basin) are
an uneven synthesis between the social norms of settled, agrarian communities
and their pastoral counterparts. It is as if the primordial kinship ties, the sexual
segregation, and the overall social framework of honor and shame associated
with the tribal and pastoral groups have been transposed onto the larger, sharply
stratified agrarian communities which place primary emphasis on, among other
things, the "shifting, ego-centered, non-corporate coalitions," or networks of
patron/client relationships.
During the "golden age" of the Abbasid dynasty (750-861), the Arab world came
under the heavy influence of both Persian and Greek thought which softened
some of the rough edges of Arab society. It was an age of intellectual and cultural
pursuits and Arab empire was at the zenith of its power and glory, heights all the
more impressive when seen in comparison to the state of European civilization
during the same time period. It is during this period that we begin to see a
certain openness to the thoughts and ideas of other peoples as opposed to the
extreme sensitivity that is evident in the Arab world today toward any
importation of "foreign" ideas.
One of the first, and perhaps the best, expression of this can be found in the
writings of al-Kindi (c. 801-8^6). "We should not be ashamed to acknowledge
truth from whatever source it comes to us, even if it is brought to us by former
generations and foreign peoples. For him who seeks the truth, there is nothing
136David Gilmore, "Anthropology of the Mediterranean Area," in Annual Review of
Anthropology. 11, (1982), p. 178.
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of higher value than truth itself." 137 In later works by al-Farabi (d. 950), the
influence of Greek philosophy, particularly that of Plato, is clearly present. For
example: "The philosopher. ..could attain to truth by his reason and could live by
it, but not all human beings were philosophers, and able to grasp the truth
directly. Most could attain to it only through symbols...Philosophy," according to
al-Farabi, "and the religion of Islam do not therefore contradict each other. They
express the same truth in different forms, which correspond to the different
levels at which human beings can apprehend it. The enlightened can live by
philosophy: he who has grasped the truth through symbols and has reached a
certain level of understanding can be guided by theology; the ordinary people
should live by obedience to the Shari'a."13*
I point this out in order to show that Arab societies have not always been
uncompromisingly hostile to alien ideas and, in fact, it was the incorporation of
new ideas with the pre-existing grandeur of Arab society that led to the "golden
age." They could do this because they were in a position of strength and
superiority vis-a-vis those from whom they borrowed. The openness that we
find here continues, although increasingly from a position of weakness
beginning in the 17th and 18th centuries, right up to the immediate post-
independence years.
137al-Kindi quoted in Hourani, p. 76.
138 al-Farabi quoted in Hourani, p. 78. Compare this to the meaning of Socrates' discussion of the
rewards and punishments of the hereafter in The Republic, Bk X, 614-621, after considerable
arguments have been made for the happiness of the just and good, and the miserable state of the
unjust and bad in this world no matter what their possessions or position in society. The many who
are unable to escape the cave can be |ust and good bv focusing on the proper symbols, or shadows, on
the walls. As an aside, the argument of al-Farabi here would seem to suggest the compatibility of
reason and revelation. While this was his public teaching, his private teaching pointed to the
ultimate tension between the two <ind that thev are in fact incompatible with one another; a choice
had to be made as neither reason nor revelation can adequately refute the claims of the other. On
this subject, see Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing , (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1973).
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In the Abbasid period, "merchants, bankers, manufacturers, speculators and
tax farmers accumulated huge sums in the great cities; urban crafts diversified
and multiplied; a commercial sector emerged in agriculture; long-distance
shipping girded the oceans; astronomy, physics and mathematics were
transposed from Greek into Arabic culture. Yet the limits to Abbasid
development were reached relatively soon. Despite the soaring commercial
prosperity of the 8th and 9th centuries, few productive innovations in the
manufactures were registered, and little technological progress was yielded by the
introduction of scientific studies." 139 Why?
First, while there was significant borrowing and adaptation, this is not to say
that there were no difficulties in the incorporation of "foreign" ideas. For
instance, despite the works of al-Kindi and al-Farabi, "there persisted a current of
thought both hostile to the philosophers and theosophists, and alien from the
attempts of dialectical reasoning to give a rational defense of the deposit of
faith...Within the community, controversies and speculations which might lead
to dissention and conflict [were usually] avoided,"140 or, more likely, condemned.
In the words of Fatima Mernissi: "From the first centuries of Islam, the Mu'tazila
[who raised the question of qadar or predestination and responsibility, and were
condemned as falasifa (philosophers) that were 'polluting' Islam with the
humanistic patrimony of ancient Greece] were castigated as being in the service
of foreigners and the propagators of enemy ideas. As such, they were repudiated
as atheists who were perverting the faith." 141
Second, the Abbasid state was in a economic position very similar to that
which curtailed the development of medieval Spain. "The balance of payments
surpluses. ..on its external account, partly because of its superior stock of precious
139 Anderson, pp. 508-509.
140 Hourani, p. 179.
141 Mernissi, p. 26.
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metals, were themselves a disincentive to increase the output of manufactures,
since there was rarely a trade deficit of the type which stimulated [some] West
European economies. ..to produce more exports." 142
There are three relevant points here. First, the ulema or the clerisy condemns
and suppresses any ideas which threaten the socioeconomic order, as is
consistent with the logic of the agrarian society. Second, there is a flowering of
the notion of the alien "other," alreadv implicit in the Qur'an itself, as being
hostile and fraught with danger. This notion is just as applicable to European
societies as it is to the Arabs,
'
43 and it makes exceedingly difficult the acceptance
of thoughts and ideas which are, in the last analysis, part of the heritage of
mankind rather than that of a particular "culture." And third, despite advances
in numerous areas, the economic, political and military dominance of the
Abbasid state confirmed the superiority of the socioeconomic structure. Not only
was there no incentive for change, the very idea of change, notwithstanding the
relatively closed-cycle nature of agrarian societies, would have appeared to be
ludicrous.
B. SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE OTTOMAN AND
COLONIAL PERIODS 144
With the advent of the Ottoman Empire we see a continuation and a
perfection of the agrarian structure in the Arab world. It is not, however,
without its differences from the previous regimes. While in keeping with the
pattern of dominant warrior elites emerging from outside society and coming to
142 Anderson, p. 516.
143 See notes 7 and 8, and also consider the notion of the "House if War" as being all that is outside
the fold Muslim civilization, a civilization dominated by Arab societies.
144
1 have grouped the Ottoman and colonial periods together because they are similar in that
during both periods Arab societies were governed by remote and foreign institutions, although more
remote in the first instance and more foreign in the second.
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rule as a distinct group, for the first time since the 7th century, those warrior
elites were not considered "Arabs." Additionally, "the [Ottoman] Empire
was. ..the first Muslim political system to create a specially organized religious
hierarchy with a clergy comparable to that of a full-scale church." 145 We also see
the full expression of sultanism develop under the Ottomans. This particular
form of government was the basis for the notion of "oriental despotism" but, as
was the case with the empires that preceded it, the Ottoman regime did not have
the means to completely dominate all of the atomistic communities which
formed the larger whole of the empire.
Be that as it may, the addition of these three elements to the existing
socioeconomic structure served to make the Ottoman Empire perhaps the
ultimate example of the agrarian order. There is a clearly defined, simple
division of labor dominated by a stratum of warrior elites and supported by a
clerisy which, while it was already distinct in society, is now organized in the
form of a hierarchical priesthood. Furthermore, the distinction between these
groups and the rest of society is made even more evident by the cultural
heterogeneity of the empire, "held together by the sword of 'Uthman."146 In
accordance with the logic of the agrarian order, this cultural heterogeneity is
purposely enhanced by the ruling stratum147 in order to maintain the divisions
between the productive masses and their consequent weakness. Finally, "the
main objective sought [by the elite stratum] was not so much the welfare of its
subjects as the welfare of the state personified by the sultan-caliph."148
145 Anderson,p.369.
146 Hitti, p. 716.
147 Note the development of the Janissaries as well as the use of Circassians, Greeks, Albanians,
Slavs, Italians, and even Armenian^, mostly pariah groups within the mostly Arab society, to not
only fill positions of importance without fear that they would develop a broad power base within
the Empire and destabilize the order, but also to have the advantages of imported ideas and
technology without concern that these things would disturb the belief system of society as a whole.
148 Hitti, p. 716.
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This last point provides some insight into the consequences of this type of
socioeconomic structure. Sultanism, as defined by Weber, is "traditional
domination" (traditional in that legitimacy is claimed for it by virtue of age-old
rules and powers) which operates primarily on the basis of the discretion of the
ruler. "Sometimes it appears that sultanism is completely unrestrained by
tradition, but this is never in fact the case. The non-traditional element is not,
however, rationalized in impersonal terms [as would be the case if a
"rationalized" bureaucracy was developed], but consists only in an extreme
development of the rulers discretion." 149 In fact, in the Ottoman system, the
traditional element of sultanism gives rise to the discretionary elements. "For
Ottoman political theory, the cardinal attribute of sovereignty was the Sultan's
unlimited right to exploit all sources of wealth within his realm as his own
imperial possessions." 150
The capriciousness of this system leaves no room for the productive capacity
of the masses to grow, and it is largely pre-empted in favor of the ruler's needs
and wishes. There is no rule of law (as defined in the Introduction) and,
therefore, "two bases of the rationalization of economic activity are entirely
lacking; namely, a basis for the calculability of obligations and of the extent
freedom which will be allowed to private enterprise...Economic relationships
tend to be strictly tradition-bound...the development of [capitalistic] markets is
obstructed, [and] the use of money is primarily consumptive." 151 Furthermore,
"the sultanate nearly always intervened against the interests of the indigenous
merchant communities in the cities, which were regarded with constant
149Weber, Economy and Society , p. 232.
150 Anderson, p. 365. This notion is opposed to the European tradition of sovereignty as, primarily,
the right to make laws. It is not difficult to deduce the reason for this as in the Ottoman system,
laws, as opposed to decrees, were already given from God, and the authority to interpret those laws
rested entirely with the Ulema. From the Western vantage point, therefore, sovereignty lay with
the clerisy.
151 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 238.
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suspicion by the ulemate," 152 as is consistent with the logic of the agrarian
socioeconomic structure. For these reasons, the Ottoman cities, particularly
Constantinople, were the classic "consumer cities" of agrarian societies. 153
Wealth was appropriated by the warrior elites and the clerisy by such means as
extensive tax farming, influence buying (both in the political and religious
spheres) and other such devices and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the
ethos of this type of society is one of consumption and disdain for production as
socially demeaning.
Beginning in the 17th century, with the repulse of the Ottomans' second and
last attempt to capture Vienna in 1683, we see the Empire dealing with the
Europeans from an increasing position of weakness. "By the end of the [18th]
century, there was a growing awareness of the dangers [of the increasing
economic and military power of the Europeans]. Among the ordinary people it
found expression in messianic prophesies, among the Ottoman elite in the idea
that something must be done. ..Some attempts were made to introduce corps
with modern training and equipment [i.e. European style] into the army and
navy, and in the 1790's, on the initiative of the new Sultan, Selim III, a more
sustained effort was made to create a new model army; but in the end it came to
nothing because the creation of a new army, and the fiscal reforms which it
involved, threatened too many powerful interests." 154 Within this situation, the
two principal, contradictory elements that have caused the distorted change
(alluded to in the Introduction) in the socioeconomic structures of the Arab
world to this day can be found.
First, there is the realization that the "other" is more powerful, and there is
the natural reaction of any order, when it comes in contact with the superior
152 Anderson, p. 376.
153 Seenote87.
154 Hourani, p. 262.
69
strength of another order, to emulate what it views as the "other's" most
impressive traits; in this case, primarily military strength. And second, that
emulation is squelched by the natural opposition to innovation found in all
agrarian socioeconomic structures. This natural opposition is made even more
severe in the case of the Arab/Islamic world by the millennium-old, mutual
antagonism with European civilization in which the antagonists view
themselves largely in relation to each other.
In the present-day Arab world, this contradiction has resulted in the
importation of certain goods and technology from the West, but the ideas,
processes, and methods which produced these items, notwithstanding a
relatively brief and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to import and internalize
these as well in the 19th and 20th centuries up to 1967, have been shunned by the
majority of the Arab world. For example, in the 1820s Rifa'a al-Tahtawi was
sent by Muhammad 'Ali, the founder of present-day Egypt who was himself an
outsider born in Macedonia, to Paris with an educational mission. Al-Tahtawi's
description of the French included these remarks: "They deny miracles, and
believe it is not possible to infringe natural laws, and that religions came to point
men to good works...but among their ugly beliefs is this, that the intellect and
virtue of their wise men are greater than the intelligence of the prophets."155
From this it is clear that the Arabs had very little conception of the essence and
the source of European power, and this lack of understanding is all the more
ironic given that al-Tahtawi was sent to gather the knowledge and textbooks of
Europe in order to gain that very understanding and the economic and military
power that went with it.
155 Rifa'a Rafi'i al-Tahtawi quoted in Hourani, p. 305.
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During this same time period, there were similar attempts to incorporate
Western ideas into the crumbling Ottoman state. 156 "Attempts at 'liberal'
renovation to conform with Western capitalist norms. ..were inaugurated by
Mahmud II in the 1820's, in an attempt to modernize the administrative and
economic apparatus of the Sultanate... But the artificial character of the new
political course soon became evident. When Turkish nationalists attempted to
impose a representative constitution, Sultan Abdul Hamid II had little difficulty
in reimposing a brutal if rickety personal despotism in 1878.
"
157
When the agrarian socioeconomic order is challenged by the superior wealth
and power of a modern industrial order, the result is what Huntington termed
the "king's dilemma." 158 Simply put, if the elites of the agrarian order are to be
successful in meeting the challenge, they must use their centralized authority in
ways that are alien and contradictory to the agrarian order; they must attempt to
reform the social and economic institutions of the society rather than using that
authority for their own aggrandizement. It is, however, precisely this reforming
process that unleashes the political power of the productive masses and
threatens to overturn the agrarian socioeconomic structure, to do away with the
ruling elites and to compartmentalize the role of the clerisy.
Since the early 19th century, finding a solution to this dilemma in the Arab
world has been problematic at best. The solution attempted by the old Ottoman
elite discussed above was simply to clamp down on reform efforts and reassert
the whole of the agrarian structure. However, the most common pattern to be
found in the political changes of the Arab world with regard to this dilemma was
156 Egypt, in all but name, was detached from the Empire in 1805 and came to occupy Syria for 10
years (1831-40) before being forced to withdraw by the European powers who were determined to
keep the eastern part of the Empirr intact for their own strategic benefit. It was joined by Algeria,
colonized by the French beginning in 1830, and Tunisia, occupied by the French in 1881.
157Anderson, pp. 388-389.
158See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies , (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1968), p. 177.
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originally played out not by Arabs, but by the "Young Turks" who overthrew
Abdul Hamid's rule in 1908.
"In 1908, a revolution supported by part of the army [which had been raised
and trained by modern, European methods] restored the constitution...In the
next few years, however, power over the government was seized by a group of
Turkish officers and officials (The Committee of Union and Progress, or 'Young
Turks') who tried to strengthen the empire by increasing central control." 159 The
old order was nominally overthrown in the name of progress by a cabal of
military officers recruited and trained in the Western manner, and a few
"enlightened," modernizing individuals seeking to ride the Western wave of the
future in reforming their own institutions.
However, the dreams of those modern-minded individuals ultimately came
to nothing as the agrarian order was overturned in its old form only to reemerge
in a new guise. "Even the most indulgent study of the 'Young Turk' regime
concludes that it was unable to create any new institutions, but merely exploited
traditional mechanisms of rule for its own purposes." 160 It is the newly formed
petite bourgeoisie, composed of the more educated members of the traditional
bureaucracy (as opposed to a rationalized bureaucracy) and middle to low
ranking military officers, that takes power ostensibly to make society over but, in
effect, it simply takes the place of the old warrior elite within essentially the same
socioeconomic structure. The maintenance of power becomes not a means but
the end.
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of the majority
of the Arab world by the European powers, the changes in Arab social, economic,
and political institutions already begun by the Ottomans were, in many ways
159 Hourani, p. 281.
160peroz Ahmed quoted in Anderson, p. 390.
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greatly enhanced, but in other ways the colonial administration contributed to
socioeconomic stagnation. However, these changes were but a side-effect of
colonization and, moreover, the Europeans had the same basic goal as that of the
Ottomans with regard to the Arab societies over which they ruled (with the
possible exception of Algeria): they sought to maintain their dominance over
these societies for their own aggrandizement in the form of both the exploitation
of resources and the pursuit of strategic advantage vis-a-vis each other. The
Europeans had no more interest in seeing the productive masses freed from
their yoke than did the Ottomans. 161
"The policies followed by England and France [when they occupied the majority
of the Arab world] could be regarded as continuations, in a more effective
form, of those of the indigenous reformers...A limited number of schools was
established or retained from the previous period, enough to train officials and
technicians at the level at which it was judged feasible to employ them, but
not enough to produce a large class of discontented intellectuals." 162
The social and economic changes wrought by European colonialism on Arab
societies was impressive. First, largely as a result of their superior organization
and technical skills, the colonial powers were much more capable of maintaining
161 There are many who would object to this notion, and certainly if one looks to the opening of
universities and other schools by the Europeans, an argument can be made that part of the self-
perceived role of the European invaders was to make life better for the local populations, to
"civilize" life in the Arab world and provide it with an opportunity to break free of the
traditional bonds. However, if we look to the "divide-and-rule" tactics of the colonial
administrations, playing off one group against another, we see the true nature of the occupation.
Furthermore, if we examine these schools a bit more closely, we find that the majority of them were
either developed to educate and train a small number of the local populations in technical fields
required for the smooth running of the occupation and the extraction of resources or they were
Christian missionary schools. "The degraded state of the Muslim world made it an obvious target
for Christian missionaries. The proselytizing crusade was launched with renewed vigor and
quickly spread..." Maxime Rodinson quoted in John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or
Reality?. (New York: Oxford University Tress, 1992), p. 49. The explosive effect that the exposure
to Western thought, with its nationalistic, scientific and secular themes, was to have on later
events was an unforeseen side-effect of the educational process begun by Muhammad 'Ali as well as
the Ottomans, and furthered by the European colonial apparatus.
162 Hourani,pp. 285, 286.
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control over the countryside than the Ottoman regime could ever hope to be.
This greatly increased centralization of power in the capitals of the colonial
administrations is key to the later development of distinct national identities in
what would become newly independent, separate states within the larger whole
of the Arab world. However, the colonial administrations were, in effect,
continuations of the old order. They governed principally by force and they were
a culturally distinct group from the societies over which they ruled; they were, in
other words, the ultimate Mamluks. But the power that this particular group of
"warrior elites" possessed enabled them to rule without the legitimizing force of
the clerisy.
Here, again, we find a pattern that is still being played out in the Arab world
today, particularly in Syria and Iraq. A warrior elite that is capable of
maintaining order without need of the legitimizing power of the clerisy does so
and pushes the clerics aside. The result is a totalitarian despotism that is far
more pervasive and intrusive in society than the classical "oriental despotism"
of the sultans. "The sovereign, who before found his power (despotic in name)
circumscribed, because with all the will, he had not the real art of oppressing, by
the aid of science finds himself a giant." 163
However deeply this affects society, the change in the basic structure is only
superficial. The society remains essentially agrarian in its economic functioning
and in its cognitive development and view of the world. The spiritual power of
the clerisy, no longer used as a political legitimizing force, retains its hold over
the "hearts and minds" of society; a hold that tends to grow in strength rather
than weaken as the political order has lost the webs of social meaning which had
made it bearable, and religious expression becomes the language of revolt. What
we see, therefore, is not the elimination of the clerisy but a continuation of the
163 Captain Adolphus Slade quoted in Gellner, Muslim Society , p. 56.
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oscillating nature of the warrior elite/clerisy relationship within the agrarian
socioeconomic structure. More will be said below on this phenomenon as the
discussion turns to the present-day political situation in the Arab world.
The second effect of the colonial period was to form the core of a new stratum
of indigenous elites: landowning "notables" and a petite bourgeoisie primarily
made up of European-educated intelligentsia and European-trained (or at least
European-styled) military officers. The land reform begun by the Ottomans and
the Egyptian Khedive in the mid- 19th century in an effort to encourage
production had the unintended result of creating a class of absentee landowners
and local "big men." By the time of the First World War, nearly half of the
cultivated land was in the hands of those owning more than 50 acres. 164 With
the coming of the colonial period, these "notables" became even more powerful
in Arab societies as the colonial administrations tended to lean heavily on this
group to help maintain order and to insure the continued flow of agricultural
products (especially cotton and silk) and other materials to European markets; a
service for which the "notables" were amply rewarded both economically and in
terms of influence with the regime. "By the 1920's, there was in most Arab
countries a class of landowners whose interests were bound up with the
production of raw materials for export, or with the maintenance of imperial
rule."165
In addition to the land owning "notables," "another kind of elite [became] no
less important: those who had an education of European type. Schooling in this
period was still mostly confined to those who could afford it, or possessed some
other advantage [a powerful patron, for instance]; even within that group, it
might still be limited by the reluctance of society to send its boys (and even more
164 Hourani, p. 289.
165 Ibid, p. 325.
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its girls) to schools which would alienate them from their families and
traditions..." 166
The third major effect of the colonial period was to mix together some of the
tendencies of the modern industrial order with the agrarian or extractive mode
of production in the Arab world. First, the expansion of mining areas (inclusive
of oil production facilities) and the cultivated land holdings of the "notables" to
include areas that had long been considered tribal, pastoral ranges in order to
increase export volume; the extension of centralized control by the colonial
administrations over the countryside; and the building of an extensive
transportation infrastructure to facilitate both of these pursuits; had the effect of
practically eliminating the hunter/ gatherer, nomadic pastoralist existence of the
tribes which had always played such a key role in the Arab socioeconomic
structure. "The 1920's and 1^30's were the period when nomadic pastoralists
virtually disappeared as an important factor in Arab society. The coming of the
railway and motor car struck at the activity on which the long-distance pastoral
economy depended: the rearing of camels for transport... [Also,] the extension of
control by central governments and changes in urban demand were causing
mainly nomadic and pastoral groups to move nearer to becoming sedentary
cultivators." 167
This development not only eliminated one of the principal elements that
made up the unique Arab socioeconomic structure (if you will recall that prior to
this, that structure depended on the periodic rejuvenation of social and political
cohesion brought about by tribal conquest of the agrarian order), but also added to
the growing number of landless, impoverished peasants and sharecroppers
whose ultimate future destination was to be the swelling urban centers of the
166 Ibid, p. 326.
167 Ibid, p. 334.
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post-independence Arab states. Be that as it may, there was no longer any
cohesive tribal force that was capable of fending off the central government and,
therefore, there was little if any opportunity to escape the predations of the elites
of the agrarian structure.
The agrarian mode of production was further entrenched by the integration,
begun in the 18th and 19th centuries, of the economies of the Arab world with
the "world economic system," a system dominated by the European "core."
"Thus as early as 1788 the French ambassador to Constantinople characterized
the Ottoman Empire as 'one of the richest colonies of France."' 168 This
integration was moved toward completion in the colonial period.
Within this system, the "periphery" areas, of which the Arab world is a part,
double as both vast resource bases for the modern industrial economic engines of
the "core," and equally vast markets for the finished goods of industrial
production. In other words, "the capitalist system in the West expanded partially
at the expense of pre-capitalist systems. Through colonialism and neo-
colonialism, the West subjected pre-capitalist formations to its own growth
requirements." 169
This, it turns out, is a double-edged sword for the Arab world. On the one
hand, the extractive process, which is not conducive to the development of a
complex division of labor and does not require that the scientific mode of
thought pervade the social order, does indeed produce wealth, but this wealth is
used to purchase the wares of the "core" rather than to accumulate capital for
indigenous manufacturing enterprises. Attempts to do so meet with little
success as the "periphery" areas have no chance of attaining a (to use the
168Abbas Alnasrawi, "The Arab Economies: Twenty Years of Change and Dependency." in Arab
Studies Quarterly. VoL9:4, (Fall, 1987), p. 357.
169 Nadia Ramsis Farah, "The Soci.il Formations Approach and Arab Social Systems," in Arab
Studies Quarterly. Vol. 10:3, (Summer, 1988), p. 262.
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economists' terminology) "comparative advantage" in quality or quantity of
production over the "core" area. The extractive process, therefore, remains one
of the few alternatives for economic survival within the system, and it serves to
stagnate structural change.
On the other hand, the process of integrating Arab societies into the world
system necessarily brings social change and accelerates the development of a
petite bourgeoisie which, in turn, creates a conflict. There is a clash between the
elements of the basic agrarian structure that are now being held in place by the
nature of the world system as well as their own preferences, and the new
socioeconomic groups created by the interaction with the world system that are
antithetical to the status quo of the agrarian order. In other words, integration
into the world system tends to have a "push-me-pull-you" effect on the
socioeconomic orders of the "periphery" areas.
We can clearly see the Arab world being drawn more firmly into this system
by the colonial experience in both the solidification of new dominant classes (the
"notables" and the Western educated "intelligentsia") as well as the spending
patterns of the colonial powers. During this period, "compared with the
investment of European capital in agriculture and mining [both of which are
extractive processes], that in industry was small, and for the most part confined
to building materials, food-processing and textiles." 170
The primary effect of this dependence on extractive processes is to severely
limit the opportunity of the productive masses to escape the domination of the
elite classes of the agrarian order. They simply have no basis for economic and
political power. The structure is not dependent for its survival on their
innovative and creative abilities and there is, therefore, no incentive for the
politically dangerous move of freeing the minds and bodies of the productive
170 Hourani, p. 321.
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masses, and allowing the dissemination throughout society of the scientific
mode of thought and the complex division of labor which results from it.
Unlike the original, European transition from the agrarian to the modern
industrial socioeconomic order which took place in conjunction with and
actually furthered the consolidation of state power, a situation that provided the
route of escape for the productive masses, the consolidation of state power in the
Arab world now became a pre-existing condition in which the central authorities
recognize the dangers to themselves of allowing the productive masses to
become free of their yoke, and without an existential threat to provide the
incentive, it is unlikely that those authorities will deviate from the maxims of
power within the agrarian order. As we shall see in the following section, that
threat is a growing reality in the present-day Arab world, partially as a result of
the very same processes that entrench the agrarian-type order within the world
system.
C POST-INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT
The post-independence era seems to mark a divergence in the political paths
of those areas of the Arab world that had been directly colonized and those that
had not been so. While monarchies were placed in power by the Europeans in
the former colonial possessions and there were already monarchies in existence
in the areas not directly colonized, the social changes (e.g. the direct exposure to
Western ideas of nationalism, secularism, socialism, etc; and the solidification of
the new elite classes of Westernized intellectuals) brought about by the colonial
experience seems to have made the old, traditional Agrarian structure
intolerable to the peoples who had direct colonial experience.
Of the monarchies established at independence, the Jordanian monarchy is
the only one that still remains, however tenuously, in power. The rest of the
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monarchies (those in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iraq) were overthrown in a peculiar
mixture of the application of the essentially Western notions of nationalism and
socialism and the rebellion against the Western dominated, world economic and
political system. It was both a grand emulation of the West and a rebellion
against it. The areas that had not experienced the full effects of direct
colonization (e.g. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states) or had pre-existing, more or less
continuous monarchies considered more "legitimate" by the populations over
which they ruled as a result of their more indigenous nature (e.g. Morocco), are
slightly less problematic for this discussion as they retained the old style, agrarian
socioeconomic structure of a stratum of warrior elites governing the productive
masses with the aid of the legitimizing power of the clerisy. The regimes of
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were also considerably aided by the material
success of the extraction process and the consequent ability to buy off internal and
external opposition to the existing order.
This apparent divergence in the political character of the regimes of the Arab
world, while real enough in some respects, particularly prior to 1967, has turned
out to be largely superficial. The "young turks" of the Arab world, Nasser, the
Ba'th, and later, Qhadaffi, rose to power in confrontation with the "lackeys of
Western imperialism:" the newly established monarchies. "They condemned
the radical individualism of capitalism, called for Arab unity and solidarity, and
promised the creation of a new social order to alleviate the plight of the masses
in Arab societies." 171 The new order that they sought to create was a grand Arab
socialist republic, a new Aral"* unity and greatness that would rival that of the
"golden age."
The well-spring of this general movement was Arab nationalism born in
opposition to Western imperialism. There was, however, significant problems
171 Esposito, p. 71.
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with the notions of nationalism and socialism in the context of the Arab world.
First, as a result of the centralization of power in the capitals of the colonial
administrations and the passing on of that centralized framework to the newly
independent states, those states (artificial and abstract creations of the West)
became reified. The institutional framework and the borders of those artificial
creations, over a period of decades, had acquired the support of entrenched
interests in each of them. Army personnel, members of the state bureaucracy,
and property owners all had an interest in maintaining the separate state entities.
Therefore, how was unity and identification with the whole to be achieved
without the disunity and bloodshed which would inevitably follow from force
and coercion?
Secondly, there is a deep and unsolvable paradox in the notion of Arab
socialism which seeks to create a synthetic and more indigenous alternative to
the "pure" socialism of the West. There are three very good reasons why this
alternative was attractive to the "young turk" regimes. In the first place, with the
expansion of the extractive processes in oil, gas, and agriculture, and the first
bloomings of capitalist enterprises, vast inequalities of wealth began to emerge in
the colonial and post-colonial periods not only within the new states, but
between them as well. The situation was analogous to the cruelties and injustices
observed by Marx in the earlv period of English industrialization as well as to the
situation in Russia in the early 1900's that moved the Bolsheviks to action.
In the second place, "the new oil, gas, and the large abandoned enterprises and
estates [left by the colonial powers] could hardly be handed over to individuals
[without increasing the already growing material inequalities]. [Therefore,] in a
variety of forms, some of them experimental, they were socialized." 172 In other
words, they were nationalized by the state.
172 Gellner, Muslim Society, p. 168.
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Lastly, "the urge to impose a severe moralistic rule on the distribution of
advantages in industrial society is known as socialism. It may be for this reason
that the moralistic tradition inherent in Islam, its vocation to uncompromising
and implemented righteousness, has its curious elective affinity for modern
social radicalism..." 173
In this way, the new, radical regimes could have their cake and eat it. They
could create modern industrial societies capable of holding their own against the
West, while at the same time they could both alleviate the socially harsh aspects
of such a major change in the socioeconomic structure and disavow the original
model of the modern industrial society. The paradox is this: while scripturalist
Islam is in some ways compatible with radical socialism, this type of
sociopolitical structure requires a rational bureaucratization of government that
is the product of the scientific mode of thought. Again, we arrive at the
insoluble contradiction between reason and revelation. Socialism is the product
of Man's reason and intellect; it is Man-centered while Islam is God-centered.
This is not to say that, at the outset, these regimes leaned in any way on the
clerisy for support and legitimation. Rather, they sought to discredit or do away
with the clerisy as an impediment to the new order while at the same time some
of the new regimes retained Islam as the "window-dressing" necessary to
differentiate "Arab socialism/' as an indigenous and authentic social, economic
and political structure, from European socialism.
Given these two primary contradictions in the aims of the radical new
regimes, it is small wonder that their grand visions of the future came to naught.
However, there are two additional reasons for the failure of these regimes to
accomplish any real and lasting change in the socioeconomic structures of their
states. One of these is that even with the turn to the Soviet Union as an
173 Ibid, p. 48.
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alternative to the West, the dynamics of the global division of labor remained
applicable as these states produced little else other than the raw materials of
extraction for export while the importation of finished, manufactured goods and
technologies continued, albeit from a different source. The result was that the
economic functioning of these societies remained more or less agrarian in
nature, providing no impetus for the permeation of the scientific mode of
thought throughout society, the development of a complex division of labor, or a
rationalization of bureaucracy.
Another reason for the failure of the new regimes' plans for the future was
that the leaders of these regimes, while they "mimicked the noise of
revolutionary change and adopted the outside trappings of socialism," they
lacked "the will and determination to wage socialist politics." 174 The opportunity
for a redistribution of wealth along more equitable lines throughout society that
the nationalization of resources and land reform provided was wasted. While
most of the "notables" were thereby disenfranchised, the wealth of the new states
merely passed into the hands of members of the ruling clique. Government
corruption became much more widespread, exacerbating the reliance on personal
ties or patron/client relationships which are, if they are the norm rather than the
exception, fatal to the development of a rationalized bureaucracy. 175
The contradictions and failures of these "young turk" regimes became readily
apparent to their subject populations with the 1967 defeat at the hands of Israel.
These regimes could no longer brush aside the popular discontent with the
capriciousness of the state (largely the result of the failure to create a rationalized
174 Ajami, pp. 41-42.
175 For a particularly good account of this phenomenon in Syria, see Yahya Sadowski, "Patronage
and the Ba'th: Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria," in Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 9:4,
(Fall, 1987), pp. 442-458. For other examples of the pervasiveness of patronage relations within
the bureaucracies of the Arab world, particularly with regard to the shillal circles of friends in
Egypt and Tunisia, see Shlomo Eisenstadt and Louis Roninger, Patrons, Clients, and Friends,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 83.
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bureaucracy, and the consequent patronage and corruption within a state that
holds the keys to all the wealth) and the secular attitudes and plans of the ruling
elites. The benefits of any economic growth went largely to members of the
ruling group with the other segments of the population benefitting little if
any. 176
As long as these rulers could hold out the possibility that these things were
necessary for the development of future power and prosperity, popular opinion
could be marshaled in support for plans and policies which went against popular
sensibilities, foremost among which was the discrediting of religion and the
religious hierarchy as backward and reactionary. However, with the utter rout
on the battlefield as irrefutable proof of the failure of these regimes to deliver on
their end of the bargain, popular sensibilities could no longer be so easily put off.
"As the Six-Day War demonstrated, diplomatically and militarily the Arab
governments had proved impotent in the international arena. ..Despite several
decades of independence, imported ideologies and development schemes
seemed to have failed. Old issues of identity, national ideology, political
legitimacy, socioeconomic reform, and Western domination persisted. The
failures of governments and national ideologies, epitomized by the
humiliation of 1967, precipitated a deepening sense of disillusionment and
crisis. ..and contributed to the political and social resurgence of Islam."177
It is at this point that we see the great adventure of "Arab socialism" come full
circle, back to the typical agrarian order or derivative forms of it. It is here also
that we see the full resemblance to the experience of the "young turks" in that
power now became the end rather than the means for the failed revolutionary
regimes. The groups within the army and the Western influenced petite
176See Hourani, p. 438.
177 Esposito, p. 76.
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bourgeoisie that had usurped the power of the traditional warrior elites of the
agrarian order, intoxicated with revolutionary spirit and nationalism, mostly
believed that they were going to bring down the old traditional order, not
preserve it. However, the means to achieve that transformation was power.
"[They] thought that power would enable [them] to fulfil [their] historical role, so
[they] tenaciously clung to it and depended on it and forgot its stating point and
good intentions until power became [the] goal rather than [the] means."178
As power became the end rather than the means to achieve a transformation
of society, the ruling elites of the previously radical regimes were left with a
choice between the only two options available to them to preserve their power.
On the one hand, they could attempt to do what ruling regimes had done
throughout not only Arab history, but throughout the history of all agrarian
orders: "coopt the religious sensibility, identify it with the interests and stability
of the nation, and channel it into less destabilizing endeavors. And as had been
the established norm, the official religious hierarchy that had long made its peace
with the men of the sword would be ready to pitch in, bless the men in power
and urge the believers to trust the men who had it within their power to order
and presumably change things." 179 This attempt to coopt religious sensibilities,
already begun by Nasser in the early and middle 1960's to thwart what was
primarily Saudi charges that his government was "un-Islamic," 180 became more
of necessity of maintaining power for not only the Egyptian rulers but also for
those of most of the other states in the Maghreb after 1967.
On the other hand, the ruling elites could ruthlessly turn the power of the
state against their own populations. This option was the one taken by the Ba'thi
178Sami al-Jundi quoted in Ajami, p. 59.
179 Ajami, p. 73.
180
"Nasser countered [these charges] bv employing religious symbols, leaders, and institutions to
legitimate and win support for his Arab socialist ideology and policies. His government controlled
or coopted the religious establishment." Esposito, p. 75. Emphasis is mine.
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regimes in both Syria and Iraq. These regimes chose to eliminate the religious
establishment as, with the importation of military technology and hardware,
they were both willing and able to establish and maintain order, their order,
without the legitimizing force of the clerisy. In both of these cases, it is
important to note the fact that the technology and hardware used by the ruling
elites to maintain their power without the clerisy was, and is, imported and not
the products of the indigenous masses.
This is part of the distorting effect that the older, more established modern
industrial societies have on the development of agrarian societies. The scientific
mode of thought which is a necessary precondition to the development of
technologies that are capable of this thoroughness of domination and coercion,
when it permeates the indigenous productive masses as it must if they are to
succeed in producing such goods, also creates internal pressures and forces that
are a mortal threat to the agrarian order. When these technologies become
available to the ruling elites without a coincident rise in the productive abilities
of the masses, the result is a stagnation of the social, political, and economic
order of society as the ruling elites are interested only in their self-
aggrandizement (typical of all agrarian elites) rather than the good of the masses
and, furthermore, they have no incentive to think in terms of that good. What
was once the "traditional" rule of a monarchy becomes a totalitarian despotism.
What both of the above options preclude is an avenue of escape for the minds
and bodies of the productive masses from the bonds of the agrarian order.
Secularism has been discredited by its inability to produce results. The religious
hierarchy has either been crushed or transparently coopted by the ruling elites
and it is, therefore, discredited as a viable force for change as well. The only
possibility for escape is therefore in popular religion, or Islamic
"fundamentalism."
86
"The appeal to Islam has. ..served as a double-edged sword [for the regimes that
have either retained the typical agrarian structure (e.g. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
states, and Morocco) or have degenerated to that same structure (e.g. Egypt and
Tunisia)]. Those who wield it run the risk of being judged by that very Islamic
yardstick, challenged or toppled." 181 The regimes that have sought to crush the
organized religious elements within their societies have tended to come under
even stronger attacks from the "fundamentalists."
The situation that the peoples of the Arab world find themselves in bears a
striking resemblance to the situation in Germany in the early 1500's, a situation
that gave rise to popularized Christianity, or Protestantism. At a time when
literacy was beginning to rise and Europe was threatened by the alien "other" in
the form of an aggressive Ottoman Empire, the primary enemies of the masses
in Germany were considered to be the corrupt Church hierarchy, the merchants
and profiteers who sold them vain and useless foreign goods, and the corrupting
influence of the influx of foreign styles and ways of life. These enemies were
sure to "bring divine wrath and punishment upon the land if Germans
continue[d] their spiritual and material folly." 182 With this in mind, perhaps
what we are witnessing is an Islamic reformation in which the economic
Gulliver is beginning to stir.
Within the Arab world, we can plainly see the elements of the agrarian
socioeconomic structure in two basic forms. One in which the traditional pillars
of power, the ruling elites and the clerisy, dominate the productive masses. In
the other, the ruling elites have suppressed the religious hierarchy and rules the
masses by the sword. In both forms, however, the productive masses are held in
check as a danger to the stability of the order, an extensive system of patronage
181 Esposito, p. 117.
182 Ozment, p. 52.
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relations becomes one of the only avenues for upward social and economic
mobility, and the societies are governed in an authoritarian manner. These
societies are, however, transitional, "which means, amongst other things, that
most of the people involved know that fundamental changes in society are
coming, and that most of the present.. .political, economic, and social
[environment] is extremely precarious and temporary. Hence, the political
struggle is played for enormous stakes: not for marginal advantages, or for top
positions in a stable structure, but, on the contrary, for control of the direction of
the fundamental changes; and the winner takes all." 183
183 Gellner, Muslim Society, p. 205 For an example of the kind of "winner takes all," "rule or die"
stakes involved, and the results of these stakes, see Thomas Friedman's account of the Asad
regime's crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in From Beirut to Jerusalem, (New York: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 1989), pp. 76-10 =>.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The main points that I have attempted to demonstrate in this thesis are: first,
that certain types of socioeconomic structures tend to predispose political
institutions toward certain forms and methods. Specifically, that
hunter/gatherer socioeconomic structures tend to lend themselves to a generally
egalitarian political system; that agrarian socioeconomic structures tend to lend
themselves to an authoritarian form of rule; and that the socioeconomic
structures of modern industrial societies lay the seeds of democratic government.
Secondly, I have attempted to demonstrate that despite Arab governmental
pronouncements to the contrary, the admixture of elements from the
hunter/gatherer and modern industrial "models," and the superficial differences
in the character of the various Arab regimes, the socioeconomic structures found
in the Arab world are primarily of the agrarian type. As a result of this, Arab
societies have a much greater tendency to be governed in a authoritarian
manner.
The point is not that liberalization and democracy are an impossibility in Arab
politics, any more than totalitarian despotism is an impossibility in a modern
industrial society. Such liberalization is indeed possible, but the way is filled
with serious obstacles to this possibility that are put in place by the nature of the
agrarian order. Unlike the modern industrial socioeconomic order which, by its
very nature, creates the necessary preconditions to democratic government (e.g.
consent, rule of law, and citizenship based on nationality), the agrarian structure
provides thin soil indeed for the democratic plant to grow.
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The agrarian structure generally will not permit the consent of the majority to
become a factor in politics because it either physically suppresses opposition or it
denies the very idea of consent as a rebellion against God (as if men could
possibly decide for themselves the good of society when the structure as it stands
has been ordained by God), or both. The rule of law, applying equally to all
members of the society, is generally precluded by the capricious nature of the
agrarian state and the consequent pervasiveness of patron/ client relationships,
and also by the denial of the concept of consent.
Citizenship based upon nationality is especially problematic for the societies of
the Arab world. While some of the heterogeneous status markers which were
necessary for the proper functioning of the "model" agrarian order have
disappeared, there continues to be somewhat of a differentiation between the
members of the elite and the productive masses based primarily on Western
language skills and education which are simply not available to everyone nor, I
should add, are they desired by everyone. Homogeneous basic education and
training in a single cultural idiom are lacking.
All of this aside, there is still a far greater problem that is specific to the Arab
world. Since independence, there has been a continuing question as to what the
limits and boundaries of the Arab polities should be. If the basic necessity of
nationalism and, therefore, national identity and citizenship is that culture be
endowed with its own political roof (and not more than one roof), then what
should be the boundaries of the Arab political roof? Should it be based on the
geographical territories of the Arab states as they now stand, or on linguistic,
historical, or religious demarcations? Should loyalty be given to local, tribal,
pan-Arab, Ottoman, Phoenician, Maghrebian, ancient Egyptian, or Islamic ties?
These are the questions that Nasser, the Ba'th and the pan-Arab forces in general
tried to answer. Needless to say, they were unsuccessful in resolving the
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dilemma. The current pan-Islamic movement is but another attempt to answer
these very same questions, and until the issue is resolved, there is little chance
for the achievement of a true national identity and a basis for citizenship that
will inspire the loyalty of those who hold it.
The third and last point is that both the global division of labor within the
world economic system and the Arab world's interaction with the European
"other" (in other words, the Arab world's economic and cultural interaction
with the West) has made the Arab escape from the closed cycle of the agrarian
order all the more difficult to achieve. Economically, the world system,
dominated by the productive' capacity of the West, makes entry into the
industrial and manufacturing spheres difficult to accomplish as the West holds
an almost insurmountable comparative advantage in quantity and quality of
production (although as the example of Japan and the "four tigers" suggests, this
advantage is not absolute and forever). The economies of the Arab world simply
have no choice but to integrate with the economies of the West,184 but they can
compete and survive economically within the system only through the
extraction of raw materials, or agrarian type economic functions.
Culturally, the alien "other" is seen in both Arab and European societies as an
obstacle to be overcome. The introduction of Western originated ideas and
methods into Arab societies, therefore, arouses a great deal of suspicion and
distaste. Since modernization and westernization are so closely associated with
one another, it is difficult at best for Arab societies to internalize the mind-set of
modernity or the scientific mode of thought (even without the already
184 This point is made especially clear by the experience of the Eastern European and former Soviet
economies upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. "When Eastern Europe opened its markets to
Western competitors, its outdated, industry faced a clear choice: integrate with the West or
perish." Matthew Brzezinski, "Eastern Europe's Car Makers Feel the Sting of Capitalism," in New
York Times. (April 28, 1994), p. CI
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considerable constraints of the agrarian structure) without engendering feelings
of defeat or self-betrayal.
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